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CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ERITREA-ETHIOPIA
CLAIMS COMMISSION IN THE HAGUE
WON KIDANE*
I.INTRODUCTION
Violations of international humanitarian law' are compensable
V.A. Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Tiya
Maluwa, Victor Romero, and Larry Cata Becker for their valuable comments on the first draft
of this Article.
The term "international humanitarian law" orjus in bello represents in its current usage all rules
of international law designed to govern the treatment of human persons, civilian or military,
active, inactive, sick or wounded in armed conflict. Hans-Peter Gasser writes that International
Humanitarian law is not "a cohesive body of law, but a category of separate legal proscriptions."
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 441 (1996) (citing Hans-Peter Gasser, International
Humanitarian Law, in HANS HAUG, HUMANITY FOR ALL 1, 3 (1993)). Most rules of current
importance are contained in the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva Convention I for the
Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 31-
83, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 1950; Geneva Convention II for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea arts. 85-133, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 1950; Geneva Convention III
Relevant to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 135-285, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 75
U.N.T.S. 1950; Geneva Convention IV Relevant to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War arts. 287-417, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 1950; and the two Additional
Protocols of 1977: Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 3-608, entered
into force Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1979 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflict 609-99, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1979. This
also comprises a set of rules formerly known as the Laws of War contained in the Hague
Conventions of 1907: Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFEE,
DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 67-84 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Hague Convention IV];
Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD
GUELFEE, DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 87-94 (3d ed. 2000); Hague Convention VII
Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910,
reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFEE, DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 97-104
(3d ed. 2000); Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFEE,
DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 105-10 (3d ed. 2000); Hague Convention IX Concerning
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in
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by a state causing the violations.2 The roots of this obligation can be
traced to Article 3 of Hague Convention IV, which states that a party to
the conflict "which violates the provisions of [international humanitarian
law] shall ... be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for
all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. 3  A
similar rule is also contained in Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.4
In practice, the enforcement of this important provision of
international humanitarian law has remained a matter of rarity,
particularly in terms of civil-rather than criminal-liability. However, a
ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFEE, DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 112-17 (3d ed.
2000); 1907 Hague Convention XI Relevant to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise
of the Right of Capture in Naval War, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in ADAM
ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFEE, DOCUMENTS N THE LAWS OF WAR 121-25 (3d ed. 2000);
Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War,
entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFEE,
DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 127-37 (3d ed. 2000). More recent instruments include the
Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1980: U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects arts. 137-255, entered into force Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 1983;
and related norms of customary international law. This set of rules is distinct from a body of
rules governing the legitimacy of the resort to force, often referred to as the jus ad bellum, which
is essentially based on Article 2 paragraph 4 and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. See
U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 2, 1 4. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (1983); FRrrs
KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 2001)
(1987); George Aldrich, The Law of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42-63 (2000).
2 The closest philosophical underpinning of this obligation can be linked to the early contributions
of Hugo Grotius, who wrote that "restitution is due, from authors of the war, for all evils
inflicted: and for anything unusual which they have done, or not prevented when they could."
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, Vol. 1H, 719 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1646).
3 Hague Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 3.
4 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 91.
5 See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 542-543 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
1995). Traditionally, enforcement methods include retaliation, reprisals, and self defense.
Measures taken under these headings include demand for compensation and punishment of
individuals for crimes associated with violations of law. Id. at 518. For a discussion of these
and other methods of enforcement, see generally id. at 517-549. Investigations of crimes and
criminal prosecutions have been the most preferred and frequent methods of enforcement of
violations of international humanitarian law. For example, since 1919, there have been five
international investigative commissions (the 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the
Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties, the 1943 United Nations War Crimes
Commission, the 1946 Far Eastern Commission, the 1992 Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate War Crimes and Other
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, and the 1994
Independent Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935
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recent exception is the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in The
Hague (the "Claims Commission" or the "Commission"). The Claims
Commission was established pursuant to a peace agreement signed by
Eritrea and Ethiopia in Algiers, Algeria, on December 12, 2000, ending a
devastating war fought between the two countries from May 1998 to
December 2000.6
The Commission was charged with the duty of deciding, through
binding arbitration, all claims by one party or citizens of that party
against the other party for loss, damage, or injury resulting from
violations of international law (mainly violations of international
humanitarian law that occurred during the war).7 The Commission
(1994) to Investigate Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of
Rwanda); four ad hoc international criminal tribunals (the 1945 International Military Tribunal
to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of the European Theater, the 1946 International Military
Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of the Far East, the 1993 International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda);
and three prosecutions mandated internationally (the 1921-23 Prosecutions by the German
Supreme Court Pursuant to Allied Requests Based on the Treaty of Versailles, the 1946-1955
Prosecutions by the Four Major Allies in the European Theater Pursuant to Control Council Law
No. 10 (CCL 10), and the 1946-51 Military Prosecutions by Allied Powers in the Far East
Pursuant to Directives of the 1946 Far Eastern Commission). See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From
Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent Criminal Court,
10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11. 13 (1997). For a comprehensive treatment of civil liability as an
alternative to criminal prosecutions, see generally John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the
Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. I (1999).
6 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the
Government of the State of Eritrea art. 5, Dec. 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 (2001), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=l 151 (last visited June 15, 2007) [hereinafter
Algiers Agreement]. See infra Section II.A. (briefly discussing the genesis of the conflict).
The Algiers Agreement states that:
Consistent with the Framework Agreement, in which the parties commit themselves
to addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian
population, including the impact on those persons who have been deported, a neutral
Claims Commission shall be established. The mandate of the Commission is to
decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one
Government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical
persons) of one party against the Government of the other party or entities owned or
controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of
the Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian
law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law.
The Commission shall not hear claims arising from the cost of military operations,
preparing for military operations, or the use of force, except to the extent that such
claims involve violations of international humanitarian law.
Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5 1.
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commenced its work in March 20018 and decided to consider the claims
of the parties in two different phases of the proceedings: a liability phase
and a damages phase. The Commission rendered the final decisions of
the liability phase on December 19, 2005. The damages phase is still
being conducted, although no decisions have been rendered by the
Commission to date as part of that phase. Thus, this Article exclusively
focuses on the Commission's work as it relates to the completed liability
phase.
Following this introduction, the second section assesses the
Commission's overall adjudicative procedures and efficiency with a view
to discerning aspects that can be used as models for future claims
litigations involving violations of international humanitarian law. In this
light, a comparison is made with the experiences of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT)9 and the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC). ° The third section is devoted to a description and
8 Hans Van Houtte, Progress Report of the Secretary General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, Annex 11,
3, U.N. Doc. S/2001/608 (June 19, 2001), available at http://pca-cpa.org/PDF/UN%20Report%
2019-06-0 i.pdf.
9 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established by the Claims Settlement Declaration
agreed to by Iran and the United States to settle claims of nationals of the United States against
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States. Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
of 19 January 1981, reprinted in I IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP 9 art. 1 I1 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1993) (1983) [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. The Claims Settlement Declaration
was one of many instruments agreed to between Iran and the United States following lengthy
negotiations relating to the November 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (commonly
known as the "hostage crisis") and related economic measures. See generally GEORGE H.
ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1-43 (1996)
(discussing the background and formation of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal); WAYNE
MAPP, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, THE FIRST TEN YEARS 1981-1991, AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 1-49 (1993) (discussing the background and the formation of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal). See also, e.g., Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria of 19 January 1981, reprinted in I IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 3
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (1983) [hereinafter General Declaration].
10 The UNCC was established by the United Nations Security Council to adjudicate claims arising
out of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. S.C. Res. 687, 18, U.N. Doc S/Res/687 (Apr. 8, 1991).
The Security Council determined that Iraq "is liable, under international law, for any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to
foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait." Id. 1 16. Describing the nature of the UNCC, the Secretary General of
the United Nations said:
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear;
it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of examining
claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
analysis of the Commission's jurisdiction, the laws it applied, the
evidentiary standards it adopted, and the remedies it granted. By so
doing, this section addresses the Commission's contributions to the
jurisprudence of a very important but rare aspect of international
humanitarian law enforcement, namely, civil liability. The fourth and
final section summarizes the Commission's contributions to the
development of enforcement of international humanitarian law,
particularly in the civil liability context.
II. STRUCTURE AND ADJUDICATIVE SCHEME:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Although unique in many respects, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission shares some commonality with the IUSCT and the UNCC.
Indeed, it can fairly be said that the pre-existence of these models of
international claims adjudication greatly contributed to the very
conception of the Claims Commission, and their experience has
remarkably assisted in streamlining the Claims Commission's
proceedings. Nonetheless, the Commission has had to struggle with
novel issues given the unique set of circumstances that necessitated its
own creation. This section addresses the structure and adjudicative
schemes of these respective tribunals and offers a comparative analysis.
A. CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIMS AND THE
CREATION OF THE COMMISSION: THE GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT
From 1889 to 1941 Eritrea was an Italian colony." From 1941 to
1952 Eritrea was a protectorate of Great Britain. 2 In 1952 it was
federated with Ethiopia. 3 Thereafter, elements within Eritrea, including
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the precursor of the
disputed claims; it is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be
involved.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991), 20, Distr. S/22559 (May 2, 1991).
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 6
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004) [hereinafter EECC] (all EECC Claims available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id= 1151 (last visited June 15, 2007)).
12 id.
13 id.
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People's Front for Democracy and Justice, the current ruling party in
Eritrea, soon commenced what would become a thirty-year movement
for independence.' 4 Relations between the province of Eritrea and the
Ethiopian government further worsened after the Marxist regime known
as the "Derg" came to power in Ethiopia in 1974.'1
In 1991 a joint military operation of the EPLF and the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which later
spearheaded the political change in Ethiopia, overthrew the Derg, and the
EPRDF and other smaller resistance groups constituted a new
government in Ethiopia. 6  Meanwhile, Eritrea became formally
independent in 1993 following a referendum. 7 Although some economic
and boundary issues would come to present challenges to relations
between the countries over the following years, relations between
Ethiopia and Eritrea were generally viewed as good over the next several
years. 8
In May 1998, however, an armed conflict commenced between
Eritrea and Ethiopia in the western part of their common boundary. 9
Within approximately one month, fighting had spread to encompass
almost the entire border between the two countries,2" including air attacks
that would leave dozens of civilians killed or wounded.2' The fighting
soon subsided, however, due in part to the advent of the rainy season,
resulting in a World War I-style trench-based standoff.22 Hostilities
picked up again in February 1999 and again in May 2000 when Ethiopia
undertook a comprehensive counter-offensive that resulted in the retreat
of Eritrean forces from territories that had been administered by Ethiopia
'4 See HAROLD G. MARCUS, A HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA 174-76, 178, 194-95, 246 (2002).
'" id. at 187-89, 199.
16 Id. at 221.
17 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 7 (2004). See MARCUS, supra
note 14, at 238-39, 246-53.
18 See MARCUS, supra note 14, at 246-53.
19 The circumstances leading up to the commencement of the armed conflict have been a subject of
immense controversy. According to the Claims Commission. the conflict started when Eritrean
forces attacked Ethiopian administered territory in the western region of the border between the
two countries. See, e.g., EECC, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, 14, 16 (2004).
20 See, e.g., EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, in 24, 26 (2004).
2 1 EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-
13,14, 21, 25 & 26,196 (2005); EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claims 2, 32, 101 (2004).
22 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claims 2, 26 (2004); EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2,
4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 1 30, 32 (2004). See MARCUS, supra note 14, at 254.
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prior to the commencement of the conflict.23 A cessation of hostilities
agreement was signed between the two countries in June 2000,24 and a
comprehensive agreement was signed on December 12, 2000, bringing a
formal end to the conflict. 25 The Claims Commission was established as
an important part of the Algiers Agreement to address matters of
compensation.26
B. STRUCTURE, TIMETABLE, AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE COMMISSION
Structurally, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission is similar
in many respects to the IUSCT. The Commission is comprised of five
members.27 Each party nominated two commissioners and a president
was mutually elected by the party-appointed commissioners. Similarly,
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is composed of nine
commissioners, with each party nominating a third of the commissioners
and the remaining third mutually selected by the seated commissioners.28
The Permanent Court of Arbitration located at the Peace Palace in The
Hague serves as the registry for both the IUSCT and the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission. Given the general complexity of the situation that
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal had to resolve and the longevity
of its operation, there were several challenges of commissioners on
different grounds and resignations.29 In the six years of its operation, the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission has had only one commissioner
resign, and this occurred within months of the commissioner's initial
appointment."
23 EECC, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia's Claims 1 & 3, 27 (2005); EECC, Central Front,
Ethiopia's Claim 2, 26 (2004).
24 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (June 18, 2000) available at be
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EEBC/E-E%20Agreement.htm [hereinafter Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement].
25 Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1.
26 Id. art. 5.
27 Id. art. 5 2.
28 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. lII le. Two commissioners were appointed
by each side (Commissioners George H. Aldrich and James C.N. Paul were appointed by
Ethiopia, and Commissioners John R. Crook and Lucy Reed were appointed by Eritrea), and a
president (Professor Hans Van Houtte) was chosen by the party-appointed commissioners. Van
Houtte, supra note 8, Annex 1 2.
29 See generally Aldrich, supra note 1, at 6-31 (providing a general discussion of such instances).
- Van Houtte, supra note 8, Annex r1 2.
Vol. 25, No. I
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While the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commissions have adopted an arbitral model, the
UNCC adopted a unique method that is neither arbitral nor pure
reparation, i.e., it is a quasi-reparation model.3' This approach was
adopted because the issue of liability had already been determined by the
Security Council, and the primary task was merely the evaluation of
losses. The UNCC is also structurally different from the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission.
The UNCC is composed of three bodies, namely the Governing Council,
the Commissioners, and the Secretariat.32 The Governing Council
oversees the works of the Commissioners, sets forth guidelines and
approves compensation recommended by the Commissioners.33 The
Commissioners adjudicate the claims, and the Secretariat services the
Governing Council and the panel of commissioners by providing
administrative, legal, and technical support.34
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's rules of procedure are
primarily based on the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules." Because most of the claims have been
of a commercial nature, UNCITRAL rules have been compatible. 6 The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, on the other hand, adopted its own
rules of procedure and evidence based on the Permanent Court of
Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States
("PCA Rules").37 Although the PCA Rules are themselves based on the
UNCITRAL rules, they are modified to "reflect the public international
law character of disputes between States, and diplomatic practice
appropriate to such disputes."3
31 See supra note 10. Reparation is traditionally understood as a demand by the victor for a lump
sum payment of compensate from the defeated without due regard to specific violations of
international law. See HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 5,
§ 1214.




35 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. I 2.
36 See MAPP, supra note 9, at 42; see generally Aldrich, supra note 1, at 412-58 (providing a
comprehensive discussion of procedural matters of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
37 EECC, Rules of Procedure, art. 1 1, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/
EECC/Rules%20of%20Procedure.PDF [hereinafter EECC Rules of Procedure].
38 See Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Sates,
Introduction, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISHIBD/BDEN/2STATENG.pdf. The
PCA Rules are made even more compatible to inter-state disputes because they provide for
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
The Commission's rules are divided into three chapters.39  The
first chapter, which applies to all proceedings, contains, inter alia,
provisions on (1) the appointment, challenge, and replacement of
arbitrators; (2) arbitral proceedings, including detailed rules on the
conduct of the hearings; and (3) issues of evidence and applicable law.n°
The second chapter relates exclusively to claims to be adjudicated
individually. It provides procedures for filing claims and defenses.4' The
third chapter addresses mass claims procedures and sets forth the
different subject-matter categories and sub-categories of the mass
claims.42
Another important similarity between the two tribunals is the
finality of the awards. Although most arbitral awards are binding, but
not necessarily final, the decisions and awards of both the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission are
final and binding without any possibility of appeal on any substantive or
procedural grounds.4 3 As such, the responsibility of the arbitrators has
been considerable. In this regard the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
and Eritrea Claims Commission, though they follow the arbitral model,
are like the quasi-reparations model of the UNCC, the Governing
Council decisions of which are final and binding without any possibility
of appeal.
The Commission began operation in March 2001 and completed
the liability phase in December 2005." Thus, the process of determining
enormous flexibility and autonomy to the parties with respect to, among other things, choice of
arbiters and also provide for the UN Secretary General to designate an appointing authority in
case the parties fail to agree on a particular one. See id.
39 See EECC Rules of Procedure, supra note 37.
40 See id. These rules contain no notable peculiarities. However, owing to the nature of the
proceedings and sensitivities of some types of evidence, the Commission's rule on adverse
inference for failure to produce evidence played an important role in the various proceedings.
This rule states that "[a]t any time, the Commission may request the parties to produce
documents, exhibits or other evidence within a specified time. The Commission shall take note
of any failure to do so, as well as any reason given for such failure. Where circumstances
warrant, the Commission may draw adverse inferences from any failure by a party to produce
evidence." Id. art. 14 4.
4' EECC Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, arts. 23-29.
42 Id. arts. 30-33.
43 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. VI I 1 ("All decisions and awards of the
Tribunal shall be final and binding."); see also Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5 17
("Decisions and awards of the commission shall be final and binding. The parties agree to honor
all decisions and to pay any monetary awards rendered against them promptly.").
44 See Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=l 151
(last visited June 15, 2007) [hereinafter Summary Report]; see also Algiers Agreement, supra
Vol. 25, No. I
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liability took nearly five years. During this time, the Commission
considered claims under several different categories and sub-categories45
and rendered fifteen different awards.46
All of the Commission's hearings were held in camera following
extensive filings by the parties.47 The first round of filings involved
Statements of Claims filed on December 12, 2001.48 Statements of
Defense responding to the allegations contained in the Statements of
Claims were filed in February 2002."9 Following these filings, the
Commission set the order for the first three rounds of claims as follows:
Prisoners of War Claims, Central Front Claims, and Civilian Claims. 0
Thereafter, the parties filed Memorials detailing the alleged violations
under each claim category and including volumes of evidence. The
evidence included, inter alia, hundreds of sworn affidavits, documents,
note 6, at 5 (stating that the Commission shall endeavor to complete its work within three years
of the filing of the claims). This target date has proven overly optimistic.
'5 Eritrea presented thirty-two claims, and Ethiopia presented eight claims within the framework of
the six major subject-matter categories established by the Commission. See Summary Report,
supra note 44 (the differences in the number of claims stemmed from organizational differences
rather than the volume of alleged violations).
46 Eritrea's awards, which followed its sub-categorization of claims included the following EECC
Partial Awards: Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17; Central Front, Eritrea's Claim 4; Civilians
Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23, & 27-32; Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related
Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26; Final Award, Pensions, Eritrea's Claims
15, 19 & 23; Diplomatic Claim, Eritrea's Claim 20; and Loss of Property in Ethiopia Owned by
Non-Residents, Eritrea's Claim 24. Ethiopia's awards, which followed its categorization,
included the following Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Partial Awards: Prisoners of War,
Ethiopia's Claim 4; Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2; Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5;
Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia's Claims I & 3; Final Award, Ports, Ethiopia's Claim 6;
Economic Loss Throughout Ethiopia, Ethiopia's Claim 7; Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia's Claim 8;
and Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8. All awards available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id= 1151 (last visited June 15, 2007).
47 See generally id.
48 EECC Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, art. 24 1. According to the Commission's Rules of
Procedure, Statements of Claim shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The names and address of the parties; (b) If the claimant is a government of a
Party or an agency of such government, whether the claim is solely of that
government or agency or whether it includes the claims of persons, and, if the latter,
the identification of such persons, including their names, places of residence and
nationalities; (c) A statement of the facts supporting the claim or claims; (d) The
violation or violations of international law on the basis of which the claim or claims
are alleged to have arisen; (e) any other points at issue; (f) The relief or remedy
sought; (g) The Commission's jurisdiction over the claim or claims; [and] (h)
Whether the claim or claims have been filed in any other forum.
Id. art. 24 3.
41 Summary Report, supra note 44.
50 Id. All remaining claims were later heard during a fourth round of proceedings. Id.
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claims forms, expert reports, satellite imagery, photographs, charts, news
reports, statements of officials, administrative and court documents, and
bomb fragments. Each party responded to the allegations of the other
through Counter-Memorials for each category of claim. The Counter-
Memorials also contained different types of evidence in support of the
responding party's defense. With respect to the Central Front and
Civilians Claims, and all other remaining claims, the Commission
allowed a third round of filings for the rebuttal of evidence contained in
the Counter-Memorials.
The Commission held its first hearing on substantive claims,
involving the treatment of prisoners of war, in December 2002, at the
Peace Palace in The Hague." The Commission rendered partial awards
with respect to the prisoner of war claims on July 1, 2003,2 in which it
found violations of humanitarian law on both sides. 3 The Commission
held its second hearing on substantive claims, which involved the Central
Front Claims, in November 2003 in the same venue.' It rendered partial
awards with respect to the Central Front Claims on April 28, 2004,11
again finding violations of humanitarian law on both sides. 6 The
Commission held its third hearing on substantive claims, which involved
the Civilian Claims, in December 2004 in the same venue. 7 It rendered
partial awards with respect to these claims on December 17, 2004,8
finding violations of international humanitarian law on both sides. 9 All
remaining claims were thereafter addressed in a final round of filings and
hearings. These claims included Eritrea's Western Front, Aerial
Bombardment, Pensions, Diplomatic, and Non-Resident Property Loss
Claims, and Ethiopia's Western and Eastern Front, Port, Economic Loss,
5' Summary Report, supra note 44.
52 EECC, Prisoners of War Claims, Eritrea's Claim 17 (2004); EECC, Ethiopia's Prisoners of War
Claim 4 (2004). The awards are "partial" in that they do not become final until after the
subsequent damages phase.
53 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, It 1i, 12 (2003); EECC, Prisoners of War,
Ethiopia's Claim 4, M 12, 13 (2003).
54 Summary Report, supra note 44.
55 Id.
56 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claim 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (2004); EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's
Claim 2.
57 Summary Report, supra note 44.
58 Id.
59 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claim 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (2004); EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's
Claim 2.
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Diplomatic, and Jus ad Bellum Claims.6  Following the filing of
Memorials and Counter-Memorials addressing each claim, the
Commission held hearings in April 2005 in The Hague." The
Commission rendered awards with respect to all of these claims on
December 19, 2005.62 It dismissed some of the claims for various
reasons such as lack of evidence63 but found violations of international
law on both sides.6'
Despite the sheer volume of cases involving claims concerning
hundreds of thousands of individuals, the Commission completed the
liability phase in approximately five years.65 Given the caseload and the
complexity of the matters involved, the speed of the Commission's
adjudicative work was perhaps unprecedented. However, it is to be
noted that some serious matters of contention are left for the damages
phase.66 Nonetheless, the Commission's overall approach to the liability
phase was done with efficacy and care.
C. CATEGORIES OF CLAIMS
As indicated in Section II.A. above, during the more than two
years of armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, tens of thousands
of people were killed, injured, expelled or displaced, and property worth
billions of dollars was damaged or destroyed in different ways. The
Claims Commission had to design a method to systematically address the
various claims of loss, damages, and injury linked to the war.
Accordingly, in its Decision Number 2, the Commission ruled that
claims could be filed under six different categories.67 These categories
include:
60 Summary Report, supra note 44.
61 id.
62 id.
63 See, e.g., EECC, Final Award, Ports, Ethiopia's Claim 6, It 19, 20 (2004).
64 E.g., EECC, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, 9 16, 20; EECC, Loss of Property in
Ethiopia Owned by Non-Residents, Eritrea's Claim 24, § V.13 (2004).
65 See Summary Report, supra note 44. The Algiers Agreement provides that the Commission
shall endeavor to complete its adjudication within three years after the commencement of its
work. Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5 1 12.
66 For example, in its Jus Ad Bellum Awards, the Commission held that Eritrea is liable for
violating the jus ad bellum; however, it left the extent of Eritrea's liability for further proceeding
during the damages phase. EECC, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, 1 20 (2005).
67 EECC, Decision Number 2, Claims Categories, Forms and Procedures, § A (2004).
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Category 1: claims of natural persons for unlawful expulsion from the
country of their residence; Category 2: claims of natural persons for
unlawful displacement from their residence; Category 3: claims of
prisoners of war for injuries suffered from unlawful treatment;
Category 4: claims of civilians for unlawful detention and injuries
suffered from unlawful treatment during detention; Category 5:
claims of persons for loss, damage, or injury other than those covered
by other categories; and Category 6: claims of the two party
governments for loss, damage, or injury.68
All of the claims ultimately filed by the parties, however, were
government-to-government claims under Category 6 with the exception
of six claims filed by Eritrea on behalf of six individuals expelled from
Ethiopia.69 These individual claims would presumably have been claims
brought under Category 1, although the Commission never referred to
them as such.
Decision Number 2 also required the claimants to group all cases
that arose out of the same violations of international law and/or the same
events into the same category.7" In addition, the decision established a
mass claims process through which a fixed amount of compensation
could be adjudicated,7 although it did not foreclose the possibility of
pursuing claims for actual damages.72 The Commission established two
tiers of fixed compensation.73 Depending on several considerations,
including whether an individual's claim was adjudicated under more than
one category, the first tier was fixed at $500 and the second tier at $1,500
per individual. " Given that the Commission has only recently completed
the liability phase of its proceedings, it has not had the opportunity to
develop the parameters of the mass claims process in any further detail.
With respect to the categorization of claims and the mass claims
adjudication process, although notable differences exist, the Commission
benefited from the experiences of the UNCC and the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. The claims categorization of each of these tribunals is
discussed in turn.
68 id.
69 See EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claim 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 18 (2004).
70 EECC, Decision No. 2, Claims Categories, Forms and Procedures, § B (2004).
71 Id.
72 Id. The decision also did not foreclose the possibility of filing claims for one individual under
different categories. See generally EECC, Decision Number 5 (2004).
73 EECC, Decision No. 2, § B (2001).
74 EECC, Decision No. 5, §§ B-C (2001) (also noting that to account for compensation for mass
claims, the Commission used a multiplier of three when considering household claims).
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The UNCC considered claims in six different categories."
Category A included claims by individuals for departure from Kuwait
following Iraq's invasion.76 The amount of compensation was fixed at
$2,500 for individuals and $5,000 for families.77 Category B included
claims by individuals for personal injury, including death.78 The amount
of compensation was fixed at $2,500 for individuals and up to $10,000
for families.79 Category C and D claims included twenty-one different
kinds of losses such as personal injury, displacement, pain and suffering,
loss of property interests, and business losses.8" The only difference
between Categories C and D was the amount of compensation sought,
i.e., while claims for losses less than $100,000 would be filed under
Category C, claims for more than that amount would be adjudicated
under Category D. ' Categories E and F included claims by business
entities and governments respectively.82
75 See generally U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Claims Processing, available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/
clmsproc.htm (last visited June 15, 2007).
76 U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Category "A" Claims, available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/
a_claims.htm (last visited June 15, 2007).
77 The United Nations Compensation Commission "received approximately 920,000 category 'A'
claims ... seeking a total of approximately US $3.6 billion in compensation... [iun total, the
Governing Council has approved the payment of more than US $3.2 billion in compensation for
over 860,000 successful category 'A' claimants." Id.
78 U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Category "B" Claims, available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/
b_claims.htm (last visited June 15, 2007).
79 The United Nations Compensation Commission adjudicated "approximately 6,000 category 'B'
claims... [and] [playment of US $13,450,000 in compensation was made available.., for
distribution to 3,945 successful claimants." Id.
80 A total of approximately $9 billion was sought under category "C" claims. U.N. Comp.
Comm'n, Category "C" Claims, available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/cclaims.htm
(last visited June 15, 2007). To date, "[t]he Governing Council approved the payment of more
than US $4.9 billion to successful category 'C' claimants." Id. With respect to category "D"
claims, $10 billion was sought in compensation. Information is not available as to the amount of
compensation awarded to successful claimants. U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Category "D" Claims,
available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/dclaims.htm (last visited June 15, 2007).
81 See U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Category "D" Claims, supra note 80.
82 U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Category "E" Claims, available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/
e-claims.htm (last visited June 15, 2007); U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Category "F" Claims, available
at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/fclaims.htm (last visited June 15, 2007). With respect to
category "E" claims, "[tihe Commission received approximately 5,800... claims submitted by
seventy Governments seeking a total of approximately US $80 billion in compensation." U.N.
Comp. Comm'n, Category "E" Claims, supra. Category "E" was further subdivided into four
sub-categories. Id. Subcategory "El" included claims for the oil sector and payment of
$610,048,547 was approved under this subcategory. Id. Subcategory "E2" included claims for
non-Kuwaiti entities that did not fall under any of the other subcategories and $12 billion in
compensation was sought under this category, but information as to the disposition of these
claims is not available. Id. Subcategory "E3" included claims for non-Kuwaiti corporations in
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The claims were categorized with a view to ensuring "uniformity
in the treatment of similar claims" taking into account "the type or size
of the claims and similarity of legal and factual issues."83 The Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission's categorization of claims generally
followed this principle. Although it adopted the same standard, it had to
design its own classifications to deal with the unique circumstances it
needed to resolve.
In many ways, the UNCC and the Claims Commission had to
deal with similar circumstances, i.e., post-interstate conflict claims for
loss, damage, or injury sustained as a result of violations of international
law. The major distinction was that the Claims Commission had to
determine whether violations of international law had occurred in each
case, whereas the UNCC already had that issue determined for it by the
UN Security Council and arguably admitted by Iraq, the violating party.' 4
As indicated above, the UNCC was established unilaterally by the
Security Council without any involvement by Iraq.5 Iraq's lack of
participation in any determination of liability or damages was another
important distinction between it and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, which was created by the contribution of both parties in
determining the resolution model for their disputes.86
In this regard, there is an obvious similarity between the Claims
Commission and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in that Ethiopia
and Eritrea mutually agreed to have their respective claims adjudicated
by an independent claims tribunal just like Iran and the United States had
done. 7 Because of the parties' participation in formulating the models of
the construction-related business, excluding oil-related work, and claims amounting to $10
billion were filed in this subcategory. Id. Subcategory "E4" included claims for all Kuwaiti
corporations, excluding oil companies, and claims were filed for $11 billion under this
subcategory. Id.
83 U.N.S.C., Comp. Comm'n Governing Council, Decision Taken by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission at the 27th Meeting art. 17, U.N. Doc.
SIAC.2611992/10 (June 26, 1992), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/decision/dec-lO.pdf
[hereinafter Compensation Commission Decision].
84 See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 10, 16.
8' See generally U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Introduction, available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/
introduc.htm (last visited June 15, 2007).
86 See generally Algiers Agreement, supra note 6.
87 Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International
Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 160, 163 (2000) ("The Iran-U.S.
Tribunal arguably exists because Iran calculated that the political costs of not cooperating were
far outweighed by the benefits of unfreezing Iranian assets and terminating U.S. court
litigation.").
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adjudication, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission and the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal did not attract the criticism that the UNCC
has due to of Iraq's lack of involvement. Indeed, the lack of political
will on the part of Iraq has had serious consequences with respect to the
effectiveness of the UNCC in its initial phase.88 By contrast, for the last
six years, the Claims Commission has had the full cooperation of the
parties and its operations have been relatively smooth.89
Unlike the UNCC, which received and adjudicated millions of
claims by individuals and enterprises,' only the party governments were
allowed to present claims directly to the Claims Commission.9' This is
an important distinction dictated by the very nature of the transactions
that gave rise to the claims. While the Iraq-Kuwait war has directly
affected virtually every inhabitant of Kuwait, including foreign
individuals and entities, the direct impact of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war was
limited to the nationals and entities of the two countries.
The Claims Commission has also benefited from the claims
categorization of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which
considered claims in two broad categories.9" The Dispute Settlement
Declaration, which set up the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, states
88 Id. at 164 ("[T]he coercive model of placing the Iraqi oil industry under UN receivership and
skimming off 30 percent of the oil revenues was wholly ineffective for many years because
Saddam Hussein simply refused to pump oil.").
89 id.
90 Some individual claimants were deemed to have been better represented privately, given the
volume of foreign investment in Kuwait and the predetermination of liability. For example,
individual claimants had more autonomy and responsibility in selecting the type of claims they
wanted to file. This enhanced individual autonomy has been praised "as possibly the most
significant contribution of the UNCC to the development of international law in the field of
claims settlement." Andrea Gattini, The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New
Procedures on War Reparations, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161, 170 (2002).
91 See Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5, 8 ("Claims shall be submitted to the Commission
by each of the parties on its own behalf and on behalf of its nationals, including both natural and
juridical persons."). In what seems to be an unprecedented decision, the Algiers Agreement gave
each party the ability to seek compensation on behalf of citizens of the other party. The
Agreement states that "[in appropriate cases, each party may file claims on behalf of persons of
Ethiopian or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals. Such claims shall be considered by
the Commission on the same basis as claims submitted on behalf of the party's nationals." Id.
art. 5, 9. This provision later became very controversial. See infra Section fII.A.4. (discussing
the Commission's application and interpretation of this provision). See Compensation
Commission Decision, supra note 83, art. 5 1(a) ("A Government may submit claims on behalf
of its nationals and, at its discretion, of other persons resident in its territory. In the case of
Governments existing in the territory of a former federal state, one such Government may submit
claims on behalf of nationals, corporations or other entities of another such Government, if both
Governments agree.").
92 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. I.
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that "[c]laims of nationals of the United States and Iran that are within
the scope of this Agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either by
claimants themselves or, in the case of claims of less than [$]250,000, by
the government of such national."93  Thus, the first category included
property claims94 of nationals of the United States against the
Government of Iran and nationals of Iran against the Government of the
United States.9" The second category included the direct claims of the
two governments against each other for contractual losses on behalf of
their nationals relating to the exchange of goods and services.96
With respect to legal standing, however, the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission differed from both the UNCC and the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal. As indicated above, the exclusion of direct
private claims was dictated by the Algiers Agreement.97 The effects of
this decision will be more apparent at the damages phase during which
the Commission will have to assess the precise amounts of compensation
due to each individual or family-either fixed or actual amounts-based
on the awards rendered during the liability phase.
Although Article 5, paragraph 8 of the Algiers Agreement
provided that the Claims Commission was to be the only forum for
adjudicating claims arising from the armed conflict between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, it made an exception for claims filed in another forum prior to
the effective date of the agreement.98 This exception is another important
distinction with the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which was
necessitated as a result of multiple cases filed in U.S. courts based on the
events leading to the 1979 hostage crisis and the counter-economic
measures that followed." Because the Algiers Agreement between
9- See id. art. I1, 3.
94 These claims include debts, contracts, transactions subject to letters of credit or bank guarantees,
and expropriation claims. MAPP, supra note 9, at 18. Some claims, however, were excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Id. These were mainly claims arising out of contracts that
expressly provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Iranian courts. Id.
95 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. II.
96 See id. art. U, 2.
97 See Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5, [ 8 ("Claims shall be submitted to the Commission
by each of the parties on its own behalf and on behalf of its nationals, including both natural and
juridical persons.").
98 id.
99 The events giving rise to the litigation began on November 4, 1979, when Iranian militants held
sixty-one U.S. diplomats in Tehran as hostages; two more senior diplomats were also detained at
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the same day. See MAPP, supra note 9, at 5. The next day,
Iranian revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeni endorsed the actions, and diplomatic efforts failed to
resolve the crisis. Id. at 5.
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Ethiopia and Eritrea did not provide for the consolidation of all claims,"°
several cases arising out of the same events have been litigated in
Ethiopian, regional, and U.S. courts. However, the proceedings of the
Claims Commission have had significant impacts on these proceedings.
For example, in 1999, while the war was still being fought,
Ethiopia brought a claim against Eritrea before the Court of Justice for
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
seeking the release of and damages for Ethiopian-owned property at the
Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa. °' Eritrea objected on the grounds
that the claim was an abuse of the process of the court and argued that it
On November 12, 1979 the United States President ordered the cessation of all oil
purchases from Iran. As a consequence, Iran gave notice that it would take further
action to damage the interests of the United States ....
On November 14, 1979 the President executed an order blocking all dealings in
any property and any interests in property of Iran and Iranian governmental
entities .... As a result, all Iranian bank accounts in United States banks, irrespective
of the country in which the funds were located, were frozen. Some $12 billion was
affected by this action ....
... Ofl November 26, 1979 the Treasury, acting under delegated authority,
granted a general license authorising judicial proceedings against Iran ....
Id. at 6-7. As the crisis intensified, the United States increased regulatory efforts against Iran.
In April 1980 the President executed orders blocking all commerce and travel
between the United States and Iran .... Thus by April 1980 there was in force a
complete freeze on Iranian assets ....
... The hostage crisis brought a new wave of litigants to the United States courts
seeking compensation from Iran. By 1980 more than 400 actions against Iran had
been filed in United States courts ....
Iran therefore faced the prospect of its frozen assets being used to satisfy United
States claims ....
Id. at 6-7. The hostage crisis lasted for 444 days and finally came to an end on January 19, 1981,
with the implementation of two major declarations--the General Declaration and Claims
Settlement Declaration-collectively known as the Algiers Declarations. Id. at 13-14. One of
the most important objectives of the General Declaration was the termination of all litigation in
U.S. courts and the resolution of the same by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which was
established by the Claims Settlement Declaration. Id. at 14-15.
100 See Algiers Agreement, supra note 6.
1o1 See Case 1/99, Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Ct. of Justice of the Common Mkt. for E. and S. Mr. (2001),
available at http://www.comesa.int/ (follow "Institutions" hyperlink; then follow "Court of
Justice" hyperlink; then follow "Precedents" hyperlink; then follow "Judgements" [sic]
hyperlink; then follow "Ethiopia v. Eritrea. IA. 1/2000." hyperlink) (last visited June 15, 2007).
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was not a matter that arose from the treaty that would grant the court
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. °2 Following the establishment of the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, however, the parties sought to stay
the COMESA proceedings in favor of the Claims Commission, and the
Court of Justice of COMESA did so accordingly without addressing any
of the substantive issues raised in the matter."3
Similarly, the Claims Commission proceedings have played an
important role in Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia."° Nemariam was brought before the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia on June 12, 2000, by several individuals of Eritrean
origin expelled from Ethiopia during the conflict against the Government
of Ethiopia and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia for the alleged
unlawful takings of the plaintiffs' property in violation of international
law. '5 A pivotal issue in the early proceedings of the case was whether it
should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in favor of the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission."°  The District Court concluded
that the case should be dismissed on those grounds, but its decision was
overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. °7 The D.C. Circuit Court noted that the forum non conveniens
issue was "a close one,"108 but concluded that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission was an inadequate forum for the plaintiffs' claims because
of its "inability to make an award directly" to the plaintiffs and because
of Eritrea's ability to set off the plaintiffs' claims against any claims that
Ethiopia might have against Eritrea."° The D.C. Circuit's findings touch
102 See id.
'0' See id.
'04 See Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390, 391-92 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
'05 See id. The action was brought under § 1605(a)(3) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
[FSIA], which vests U.S. courts with jurisdiction in cases "in which rights in property taken in
violation of international law are in issue" and where certain other requirements are met. 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006). See Nemariam, 315 F.3d at 392.
'06 See Nemariam, 315 F.3d at 392-93.
'07 See id. at 393-95.
108 Id. at 395.
'09 Id. Following the reversal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the
case returned to the District Court where it has had "a protracted history." Nemariam v. Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 400 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 n.1 (D.D.C. 2005). As of the writing
of this article, the lawsuit was again on appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals after having
been dismissed for a second time by the District Court on the grounds that the expropriation
exception of the FSIA established subject matter jurisdiction only in cases where tangible
property rights were at issue. Id. at 81-83. The District Court found that the rights relevant to
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on the important issue of how effective the imposition of civil liability
for violations of international humanitarian law is if the victims of
violations are not directly compensated.
IlI. JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW, AND EVIDENCE
This section discusses the Commission's jurisdiction, the laws it
applied, the evidentiary matters it addressed, and the remedies it granted.
The Commission addressed all of these issues in its various decisions. In
discussing these issues, this section makes extensive reference to these
various decisions.
A. JURISDICTION
The source of the Claims Commission's jurisdiction is Article
5(1) of the Algiers Agreement. It states that the Commission's
jurisdiction extends to:
All claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the
other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons)
of one party against the Government of the other party... that are (a)
related to the conflict.. . and (b) result from violations of
international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva




In its very first decision, the Commission interpreted the scope
of its jurisdiction. In doing so, the Commission addressed several areas
of contention and paid particular attention to the Commission's
supervisory jurisdiction, i.e., the power of the Commission to interpret or
implement the Algiers Agreement, and temporal jurisdiction."' In the
subsequent partial awards that the Commission issued with respect to the
parties' substantive claims, the Commission expanded on these two
issues and addressed other important jurisdictional questions. Discussion
jurisdiction in the Nemariam proceedings were intangible contractual rights to withdraw money
from bank accounts at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. Id. at 83-84. The District Court
further held that jurisdiction was lacking under the expropriation exception to immunity because
the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia did not own or operate the bank accounts, which is one of the
requirements of the FSIA's expropriation exception. Id. at 84-86.
0 Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5, 1.
. See EECC, Decision No. 1, §§ A-D (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001), available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=1 151 (last visited June 15, 2007).
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of the Commission's key jurisdictional findings is contained in the
following sections.
1. SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION
The Claims Commission ruled that it could not imply
supervisory jurisdiction to interpret the Algiers Agreement from Article
5(1) of that agreement."' The Commission concluded that if the parties
had envisioned the grant of supervisory authority, they would have
expressly provided for it."3 The Commission contrasted this approach
with the jurisdiction of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which
was given express authority to decide disputes regarding the
interpretation and application of the Claims Settlement Declaration
agreed to by Iran and United States." 4 This decision left the issue of
authority to interpret the Algiers Agreement as it relates to the Claims
Commission's work an open question.
However, the Commission's subsequent decisions make clear
that it did not completely refrain from filling this gap. One such example
is its decision on Ethiopia's jus ad bellum claim." 5 In that case, Eritrea
argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because the Algiers
Agreement assigned the authority to determine the "origins of the
conflict"-and, thus, a party's resort to force-to an independent
investigative body." 6 Eritrea relied on Article 3 of the agreement, which
states that "[i]n order to determine the origins of the conflict, an
investigation will be carried out on the incidents of 6 May 1998 and on
any other incident prior to that date which could have contributed to a
misunderstanding between the parties regarding their common border,
including the incidents of July and August 1997."' 7 In interpreting this
112 Seei. § A.
'3 See id.
114 See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. 1I, 3 ("The Tribunal shall have
jurisdiction, as specified in Paragraphs 16-17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of
January 19, 1981, over any dispute as to the interpretation or performance of any provision of
that Declaration.").
15 Ethiopia's jus ad bellum claim is one of several claims that it presented against Eritrea.
Although Eritrea also presented several independent claims based on alleged violations of
international humanitarian law, it did not have a jus ad bellum claim against Ethiopia. The
parties' most important claims based on alleged violations of international humanitarian law are
discussed under different headings in Part III. See infra Part III.
116 See EECC, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, 3 (2005).
117 Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3, 1.
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provision, the Commission held that the terms "origins of the conflict"
and "misunderstanding between the parties regarding their common
border" did not refer to the legal issue of whether Eritrea unlawfully
resorted to the use of force."8 More importantly, the Commission stated
that "it seems clear that Article 3 was carefully drafted to direct the
impartial body to inquire into matters of fact, not to make any
determinations of law. This Commission is the only body assigned by
the Agreement with the duty of deciding claims of liability for violations
of international law.""' 9 Thus, this decision provides an example of the
Commission's assertion of interpretive authority despite its decision
regarding supervisory jurisdiction. However, such authority was indeed
vital for the proper disposition of cases brought under the Algiers
Agreement.
2. TEMPORAL JURISDICTION
The Commission defined the scope of its temporal jurisdiction in
the first decision it rendered, concluding:
[T]he central reference point for determining the scope of [the
Commission's] mandate under Article (5)1 of the Agreement is the
conflict between the parties. In the overall context of the relevant
documents cited in Article (5)1, the Commission understands this to
mean the armed conflict that began in May 1998 and was formally
brought to an end by the Agreement on December 12, 2000. There is
a presumption that claims arising during this period "relate to" the
conflict and are within the Commission's jurisdiction.' 20
The Commission went on to conclude:
[C]ertain claims associated with events after December 12, 2000,
may also "relate to" the conflict, if a party can demonstrate that those
claims arose as a result of the armed conflict between the parties, or
occurred in the course of measures to disengage contending forces or
otherwise to end the military confrontation between the two sides.'
2
'
As an example, the Commission cited claims that could
potentially arise for violations of international humanitarian law that
might have occurred as the military forces were withdrawing from
"' EECC, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, T 4 (2005).
119 Id. T4.
120 EECC, Decision No. 1, § B (2001).
121 id. T C.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
occupied territory after December 12, 2000.122 In its later partial awards,
the Commission noted that this principle was "in harmony with
important international humanitarian law principles, which continue to
provide protection throughout the complex process of disengaging forces
and addressing the immediate aftermath of armed conflict."'
123
The Commission's temporal jurisdiction was tested during the
prisoner of war proceedings, the first round of claims heard by the
Commission. During these proceedings, the issue arose whether
Eritrea's claim of alleged mistreatment of prisoners of war, including a
delay in repatriation of prisoners following the signing of the Algiers
Agreement on December 12, 2000, was sufficiently related to the conflict
to be within the Commission's jurisdiction.' 24 Ethiopia maintained that
the Commission did not have jurisdiction over such claims, 125 and,
having taken this position, made no repatriation or related claims.
26
Ethiopia further argued that the repatriation issue was governed by
Article 2 of the Algiers Agreement, which provided that "[i]n fulfilling
their obligations under international humanitarian law.., the parties
shall without delay release and repatriate all prisoners of war,"'' 27 rather
than Article 118 of Geneva Convention III.12' As such, Ethiopia argued
that the Claims Commission could not decide the repatriation issue
because doing so would require it to entertain a claim concerning "the
interpretation or implementation of the [Algiers] Agreement," which, as
discussed in the preceding section, the Commission had earlier found it
was not empowered to do.
129
The Commission concluded that it had jurisdiction to address the
repatriation claim and other claims of mistreatment arising after the
122 id.
2 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 15 (2004) (citing Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3517, 3522) ("Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment may take
place after [the general close of military operations] ... shall meanwhile continue to benefit by
the present Convention.").
124 See EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, §§ IH, V.A.; EECC, Prisoners of War,
Ethiopia's Claim 4, §§ I1, V.A.
125 E.g., EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 16 (2003). The final repatriation of
prisoners of war by Eritrea did not occur until August 2002, and Ethiopian repatriation occurred
in November 2002. See, e.g., id. 10.
126 E.g., id. 16.
127 Id. 17 (citing Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2).
28 See id. -HJ 18, 22.
129 Id. 1 18.
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signing of the Algiers Agreement.'3 ° The Commission stated that "the
timely release and repatriation of POWs is clearly among the types of
measures associated with disengaging contending forces and ending the
military confrontation between the two Parties that fall within the scope"
of its jurisdiction. 3' The Commission further rejected Ethiopia's
argument that the Commission was prevented from addressing the
repatriation claim because doing so would require it to interpret the
Algiers Agreement.'32 The Commission observed that Article 118 of
Geneva Convention III was still in play and that "[i]t frequently occurs in
international law that a party finds itself subject to cumulative
obligations arising independently from multiple sources."'3 3  The
Commission went on to hold Ethiopia liable for the delayed repatriation
of Eritrean POWs.'34
The Commission was not as sympathetic to Eritrea's claim that
"the alleged forcible expulsion from Ethiopia of 722 persons in July
2001" was a claim related to the conflict and, thus, fell within the
Commission's temporal jurisdiction.33  With no discussion of the
evidence presented on the issue, the Commission concluded that "the
record did not establish that this event was related to the disengagement
of forces or otherwise fell within the scope of the Commission's
jurisdiction pursuant to Decision No. 1."'136
The Commission also took a more limited approach to its
temporal jurisdiction with respect to Eritrea's claim against Ethiopia for
allegedly preventing displaced Eritreans from returning to their homes in
territory under the continued occupation of Ethiopia in violation of
Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV.' Eritrea argued that because the
original displacement of these individuals occurred during the conflict,
110 Id.
I3' id. 120.
32 See id. 22.
133 See id. (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 174-178
(June 27)).
'4 Id. $ 163.
135 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16,23 & 27-32, 16 (2004).
136 Id.
137 See EECC, Western Front, Arial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-
13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, 1 122-130 (2005). The Commission observed that "it became clear in the
further pleadings that the claim was directed at events that occurred after the conclusion of the
Agreement in the Temporary Security Zone and in areas south of that zone that were determined
by the Boundary Commission in 2002 to be on the Eritrean side of the border." Id. 122.
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their inability to return home "related to the conflict."'' Eritrea relied on
the Commission's earlier decision regarding temporal jurisdiction in the
prisoners of war proceedings by seeking to analogize the position of
these individuals with the prisoners of war whose repatriation was
delayed.'39 The Commission, however, did not agree with the analogy
and concluded that Eritrea's claim for the alleged prevention of the
displaced persons' return did not meet the requirements of Decision No.
1.140 The Commission stated that the requirement to repatriate prisoners
of war was "an explicit element of an integrated body of law, Geneva
Convention III of 1949, brought into operation by the war,"".4 whereas
"Geneva Convention IV creates no corresponding duty with respect to
the return of displaced civilians."'42 The Commission observed that it
"appreciates the importance of the resettlement of displaced persons after
the close of hostilities, but claims relating to these matters fall outside of
the restricted temporal scope of its jurisdiction under the Agreement.
Indeed, return or resettlement is likely to require considerable time and
resources, extending long after the conflict's end."' 43
Thus, although the Commission indicated a willingness in the
first round of proceedings to take a somewhat expansive interpretation of
its temporal jurisdiction, it took a more limited approach in later
proceedings. Although the Commission's discussion of why the alleged
expulsion of individuals in July 2001 was not related to the conflict was
rather cursory, its later discussion regarding the alleged prevention of
displaced persons from returning to occupied territory involved a much
more thorough discussion of the applicable law and facts.
138 Id. 126.
139 See id.; see also EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 146 (2003).
140 EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13,
14, 21, 25 & 26, 1127 (2005).
141 id.
142 Id. 1128.
41 Id. The Commission noted that the preamble to the Algiers Agreement specifically noted that the
Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) and the United Nations were committed
to "work[ing] closely with the international community to mobilize resources for the resettlement
of displaced persons." Id. (citation omitted). The Commission also noted that its limited
supervisory jurisdiction precluded it from adjudicating any aspect of the claim relating to the
Temporary Security Zone because this zone was established in the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement. Id. 1129.
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3. EXTINGUISHING OF CLAIMS NOT FILED BY DECEMBER 12, 2001
The Commission found that several claims that were not filed by
December 12, 2001, were extinguished pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 8
of the Algiers Agreement for not having been timely filed.'" During the
prisoner of war proceedings, the Commission found three such claims
filed by Eritrea.4 5 Eritrea argued that it had not discovered the violation
at issue in one of these claims until after the filing deadline, but the
Commission rejected this argument.'46 With respect to the other two
claims that were extinguished, the Commission recognized "[t]hat,
during the proceedings, the Parties may wish to refine their legal theories
or present more detailed or accurate portrayals of the underlying facts."'4 7
Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that these two claims were not
"identified with the degree of clarity required to permit balanced and
informed proceedings."'48 The Commission also found that one claim
filed by Ethiopia-the repatriation claim discussed above-was
extinguished, which followed from the position taken by Ethiopia that
144 EECC, Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia's Claim 8, 10-13 (2005); EECC, Diplomatic Claim,
Eritrea's Claim 20, I 9-12 (2005); EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related
Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, in 86-87 (2005); EECC, Civilians
Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5, I9 19-21 (2004); EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16,
23 & 27-32, 22 (2004); EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, In 11-17
(2004); EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 1 23-29 (2003); EECC, Prisoners of War,
Ethiopia's Claim 4, 9 19-21 (2003). The Algiers Agreement states that "[alll claims submitted
to the Commission shall be filed no later than one year from the effective date of this
agreement .... [Siuch claims that could have been and were not submitted by that deadline
shall be extinguished, in accordance with international law." Algiers Agreement, supra note 6,
art. 5, 18.
145 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17,125 (2003). These included the following: (1) the
claim that Eritrean prisoners of war "were subjected to insults and public curiosity" in violation
of Article 13 of Geneva Convention M; (2) the claim that female Eritrean prisoners of war "were
accorded inappropriate housing and sanitation conditions" in violation of Articles 25 and 29 of
Geneva Convention HI; and (3) the claim that Eritrean prisoners of war "were mistreated during
transfers between camps" in violation of Article 46 of Geneva Convention II. Id. 1[ 24.
Eritrea's claim that its civilians were detained in camps with prisoners of war was deferred to the
Civilians Claims proceedings during which the Commission ultimately concluded that Ethiopia
was not liable for this alleged violation. Id. 9N 24, 28; EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims
15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 9 119-22 (2004).
146 See EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 1 26 (2003) (Eritrea explained that it did not
discover a website operated by Ethiopia containing photographs and personal information about
Eritrean prisoners of war, which Eritrea contended subjected the prisoners of war to "insults and
public curiosity," until after the deadline had passed.).
... See id. 9127.
148 See id. 9[ 26.
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such a claim was outside the temporal scope of the Commission's
jurisdiction.49
The Commission also dismissed several claims filed by Eritrea
during the proceedings for the Central Front on the grounds that they
were not timely filed. Four of these claims were dismissed summarily
for not having been included in Eritrea's statements of claim: (1)
"[a]lleged violations of international law by Ethiopia occurring after
March 2001;" (2) "[a]lleged continuing unlawful occupation that
occurred after March 2001;" (3) "[a]lleged unlawful use of landmines by
Ethiopia" in one geographic area; and (4) "[a]lleged conduct by Ethiopia
of unlawful "political re-education" classes in one geographic area. 50
Two other claims pursued by Eritrea were also dismissed in
whole or in part, but they prompted further discussion by the
Commission. The first claim was Eritrea's allegation that Ethiopia had
unlawfully failed or refused to stop illegal action by Ethiopian soldiers in
two geographic areas in Eritrea. 5' The Commission observed that
Eritrea's statement of claim for one of the geographic areas had made a
reference to an Ethiopian officer ignoring rape complaints.'52 The
Commission observed, however, that the particular statement of claim
did "not include in its list of relevant treaty articles any dealing with the
responsibility of commanders; nor, more importantly, [did] it include any
reference to the failure of commanders to stop illegal conduct by the
troops under their command when it lists the violations of international
law" upon which Eritrea based its claims for that geographic area.'53 As
such, the Commission concluded that this claim was not stated with the
degree of specificity required and found that it was extinguished pursuant
to Article 5, paragraph 8."' The Commission made a similar finding
with respect to the other geographic area addressed by Eritrea as part of
this claim, observing that Eritrea had made no reference to the failure or
refusal of Ethiopian commanders in this geographic area to stop the
illegal conduct of soldiers serving under them.'55
149 See EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 20 (2003).
IR0 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2,4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 13-14 (2004).
"' See id. V 15-16.
152 Id. 15.
153 Id.
154 See id. The Commission noted, however, that this finding did "not affect Eritrea's claims that
Ethiopia is liable for illegal conduct by members of its armed forces," Id.
155 See id. 16 (noting that with respect to this geographic area, all of the violations alleged by
Eritrea were "intentional or deliberate actions by the Ethiopian army" and not done by omission).
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The second claim that the Commission explored in more detail
before finding that part of it was extinguished was Eritrea's claim
concerning alleged violations of Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons and Protocol I to Geneva Convention
IV.156 The Commission concluded that although its Rules of Procedure
required a "'precise statement' of 'the violation or violations of
international law on the basis of which the claim or claims are alleged to
have arisen,' [they did] not require that the Statement of Claim specify
every treaty article that might be relevant to a claimed illegal act."'57 The
Commission went on to explain that what was "required is adequate
notice to the Respondent of the act that gives rise to the claim and the
assertion that it was in violation of applicable international law."' 8 Thus,
the Commission concluded, for example, that "where illegal use of mines
or booby-traps is alleged in [Eritrea's] Statement of Claim, the claim is
not extinguished simply because no reference is made to Protocol II of
1980."' 9 On the other hand, the Commission concluded that Eritrea's
claim with respect to "undefended localities" under Article 59 of
Protocol I was extinguished because Eritrea had not referred to
"undefended localities" in its Statements of Claim."6° Although the
Commission did not articulate the precise contours of its findings, it
appears that failure by a party to state the factual basis for its claims in its
Statements of Claim was more likely to lead to that claim being
extinguished than any omission of the legal grounds for the claim.
Ethiopia likewise fell victim to claim extinguishment during the
proceedings related to the civilian claims.'6 ' During these proceedings,
156 See id. 17.
17 Id. The Commission built on this statement in a later partial award when it observed that "the
Commission does not regard references to additional international legal authorities or legal
arguments to support a claim presented in the Statements of Claim as constituting impermissible
new claims." EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 22 (2004).
158 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 1 17 (2004).
159 Id. (referring to Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1529).
'60 See id.
161 EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5, U 20-21 (2004). Ethiopia also made timeliness
challenges to some of the claims Eritrea pursued during the "Civilians Claims" proceedings and
the "Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims" proceedings; however, these
challenges were rejected by the Commission. EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16,
23 & 27-32, 22; EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's
Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, 91 86-87 (2005). Challenges were also made successfully
by both parties during the "Diplomatic Claims" proceedings. EECC, Diplomatic Claim,
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Eritrea argued that eighteen specific claims being pursued by Ethiopia
had not been properly identified in Ethiopia's statements of claim. 62 The
Commission found that three of these claims had not been timely raised:
(1) failure to provide proper transport conditions to or among detention
camps; (2) exposure of Ethiopian detainees and internees to public
curiosity; and (3) forcing Ethiopians to donate blood.'63 The Commission
noted that many of the remaining challenged claims were part of more
general claims such as Ethiopia's claim for "unlawful treatment and
conditions of confinement," that had been sufficiently articulated in
Ethiopia's Statements of Claim."
4. CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NON-NATIONALS
When claims are asserted by states on behalf of individuals
against another state, nationality is often the single most important factor
for the determination of legal standing.'65 This issue was one of the most
difficult adjudicatory challenges that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission faced. The issue had distinct peculiarity because it
emanated from a remarkably unique and complex set of circumstances.
These circumstances are briefly described as follows.
Ethiopia's Claim 8, N 10-13 (2005); EECC, Diplomatic Claim, Eritrea's Claim 20, U 9-12
(2005).
162 EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5, 20 (2004). The claims were that Eritrea did the
following:
1. Interned Ethiopians at the Massawa Naval Base; 2. Did not provide proper
conditions of transport to detention or between supposed detention sites; 3.
Interrogated Ethiopians; 4. Exposed Ethiopian detainees/internees to public curiosity;
5. Subjected Ethiopians to curfew; 6. Subjected Ethiopians to house arrest; 7.
Rounded up Ethiopian street children; 8. Did not allow Ethiopians to congregate in
public places; 9. Did not provide separate quarters for women held in detention; 10.
Housed Ethiopian detainees with criminals; 11. Housed healthy detainees with those
who were infirm; 12. Improperly denied relations with the exterior to Ethiopian
detainees/internees; 13. Interfered with detainees'/internees' freedom of religion; 14.
Improperly failed to post camp regulations; 15. Allowed children to be beaten in
Eritrean schools, both by Eritrean teachers and by Eritrean students; 16. Prohibited
employers from paying Ethiopian workers; 17. Conducted "sweeps" of the street of
Assab to collect young Ethiopian men; and 18. Forced Ethiopians to donate blood.
Id.
161 Id. U 20-2 1.
'6' See id. 21.
165 Id. For example, the issue of nationality figured prominently in the jurisdictional issues
presented during the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. See, e.g., RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: CONTROVERSIES, CASES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 120-
145 (1990).
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Eritrea claimed that all inhabitants of present-day Eritrea and
persons of Eritrean descent who had never acquired another nationality
were nationals of Ethiopia until Eritrean independence in 1993.166 The
issue of nationality remained unresolved following Eritrea's
independence and became further complicated when the two parties went
to war in 1998.167
The most important dispute between the parties regarding
nationality related to the manner of Eritrea's independence. Eritrea's
official independence in May 1993168 followed a referendum held
pursuant to a proclamation that the Eritrean Provisional Government
issued in April 1992.169 The provisional administration had been
established in May 1991 following the EPLF's gaining of control over
the territory of present-day Eritrea. 7' Eritrea's legal status between May
1991 and May 1993 was ambiguous and, as such, was a disputed fact. 7'
Following the start of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
in May 1998, Ethiopia expelled thousands of persons of Eritrean origin
on national security grounds. 7 2 Eritrea argued that Ethiopia's expulsion
was contrary to international law because, among other things, it
amounted to a denationalization of Ethiopian nationals because of their
Eritrean descent.'73 Ethiopia, on the other hand, argued that the expelled
individuals had acquired Eritrean nationality as of the time of the
Eritrean referendum by operation of (1) the Eritrean proclamation that set
forth the requirements for the referendum'74 and (2) Ethiopia's own
nationality law.'75 Under the referendum proclamation, every individual
taking part in the referendum had to be able to demonstrate that he or she
166 See EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 39 (2004).
167 See id. 46-47.
161 See id. H 7, 39.
169 See Proclamation No. 21/1992 of the Provisional Government of Eritrea (April 6, 1992) (setting
forth several requirements for acquiring Eritrean citizenship, which include birth, marriage and
naturalization) available at http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL3ae6b4e026.html (last
visited June 15, 2007), cited in EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32,
40 (2004).
'70 See EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 6, 7 (2004).
"' See id. 45.
172 See id. IT 65, 79-80.
'.. See id. I 79-80.
114 See id. 45.
' See id. 143.
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was an Eritrean national.'76 And, according to Ethiopia's nationality law,
anyone who acquired another nationality lost his or her Ethiopian
nationality by operation of law.'77
This argument was complicated by Ethiopia's continued
treatment of these individuals-i.e., persons of Eritrean descent who had
taken part in the Eritrean referendum-like its own nationals from 1993
to 1998, including the issuance of passports and granting of all
citizenship privileges pursuant to an agreement made between the two
parties.' The agreement, which was in the form of meeting minutes
signed by high-ranking officials of the two governments in 1996,
provided that "on the question of nationality, it was agreed that Eritreans
who have so far been enjoying Ethiopian citizenship should be made to
choose and abide by their choice."'79
The two major issues that arose were (1) whether registering to
vote for the Eritrean referendum, which required one to possess Eritrean
nationality as set forth under the Eritrean nationality law issued by the
provisional government of Eritrea, amounted to the acquisition of
Eritrean nationality before the Eritrean state was formally established,8 '
and (2) whether Ethiopia's continued treatment of individuals as its own
citizens who qualified under the Eritrean nationality law as Eritrean
nationals amounted to the recognition of the continuity of their Ethiopian
nationality.''
The Commission came up with a creative resolution
commensurate with its arbitral role. It held that registering for the
Eritrean referendum could not have been done without legal
176 See Proclamation No. 22/1992 of the Provisional Government of Eritrea (Apr. 7, 1992) (setting
forth the procedures for participating in the Referendum), cited in EECC, Civilians Claims,
Eritrea's Claim 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 41 (2004). The text of the relevant provision reads:
Any person having Eritrean citizenship pursuant to Proclamation No. 21/1992 on the
date of his application for registration and who was of the age of 18 years or older or
would attain such age at any time during the registration period, and who further
possessed an Identification Card issued by the Department of Internal Affairs, shall
be qualified for registration.
Id. [ 41 (citing Proclamation No. 21/1992 of the Provisional Government of Eritrea (Apr. 7,
1992)).
'77 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 46 (2004).
171 See id. N 46-50.
179 Id. 52. The Commission concluded that it was unnecessary to determine whether the minutes
constituted a binding treaty between the two states because, regardless of the document's legal
status, it showed the parties' intentions. Id. 53.
"0 See id. 44.
'8' See id. T 46.
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consequences." 2 At the same time, however, the Commission concluded
that continued treatment of individuals as nationals, including issuance of
passports, "is an internationally significant act, not a casual courtesy."'83
Consequently, "the Commission conclude[d] that those who qualified to
participate in the Referendum in fact acquired dual nationality. They
became citizens of the new State of Eritrea pursuant to Eritrea's
Proclamation No. 21/1992, but at the same time, Ethiopia continued to
regard them as its own nationals."'"
In its determination, the Commission did not rely on
international precedent because it had to resolve an unprecedented set of
issues. In this case, the issues of nationality and a state's legal standing
to claim on behalf of individuals arose in a manner that clearly diverged
from the manner in which these issues had traditionally arisen in the
context of international disputes.
The standing of dual nationals in international law has long been
a subject of immense controversy.'85 International tribunals often
"2 See id. 148.
181 Id. 49.
184 Id. 51. The Commission made this ruling despite Eritrea's argument that it could not have
conferred Eritrean nationality prior to its formal existence. Id. [ 44. The Commission said that
Eritrea enacted its nationality law prior to its formal recognition. Id. 1 48. The authorities
exercised effective control over a defined territory and population, undertook complex
international relations and, as such, had de facto existence. Id. See generally IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-72 (6th ed. 2003) (describing the legal criteria
of statehood); AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-81 (Peter
Malanczuk ed., 7th rev. ed. 1997) (describing the definition of a state for purposes of
international law).
185 E.g., KHAN, supra note 165, at 122. Although there is still some controversy regarding whether
dual nationals can bring claim against one of the states of their nationality, the question seems to
be increasingly answered in the affirmative. See id. at 122-23. See generally Peter E. Mahoney,
The Standing of Dual Nationals before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 24 VA. J. INT'L
L. 695 (1984); Notes, Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modem Era: The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 83 MICH. L. REV. 597 (1984). This controversy, however, relates only to
situations where the two states are parties to the dispute. There is little controversy when the
respondent is a third state because of the existence of a relatively clear rule. See, e.g.,
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 5, reprinted in
11 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL J. 847 (1930):
Within a third state, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he
had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal
status and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which
any such person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territory either the nationality
of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of
the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely
connected.
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consider two competing theories: the theory of non-responsibility and the
theory of dominant-and-effective nationality.'86 The theory of non-
responsibility "is based on the principle of sovereign equality of states"'87
because the determination of nationality has always been considered the
exclusive prerogative of the state.' Under this theory, if two states
consider the same individual to be their national, any choice between the
two by an international tribunal is considered a preference for the
nationality laws of one nation over the other."9 This is believed to
negate the principle of sovereign equality of nations."g
The theory of dominant-and-effective nationality, on the other
hand, is based primarily on the seminal Nottebohm case decided by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1955.' In that case, the ICJ held
that nationality is:
Id. But see Nissim Bar-Yaacov, Dual Nationality, in 54 LIR. WORLD AFF. 214-17 (George W.
Keeton & George Schwarzenberger eds., 1961); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (contending that dual nationals could not bring claims against
either of their states of nationality).
186 KHAN, supra note 165, at 122.
187 id.
188 See, e.g., Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra
note 185, art. 1 ("It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This
law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions,
international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality.").
See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 184.
89 See KHAN, supra note 165, at 122.
'90 Id. at 122-123. For example, Guy I.F. Leigh argues that:
[I]f both nationalities are valid, then to permit one state to represent the individual
against his other state would be given greater effect to the nationality of the claimant
state, thus denying this sovereign equality. Therefore, neither state of which the
individual is a national may represent him against the other state whose nationality he
possesses.
Guy I.F. Leigh, Nationality and Diplomatic Protection, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 453, 460 (1971)
quoted in KHAN, supra note 165, at 122-123. Under this theory, the practical difficulties
associated with dual nationality are emphasized as follows:
[Tihe State of one of his nationalities can never give him, or his interests, diplomatic
protection or support, or bring an international claim on his behalf, against the State
of his other nationality even if he is not at the time resident in that State, and is
resident in the territory of the State desiring to claim. If this were not so, a dual
national having a grievance against the authorities of one of his countries, in which he
was resident, would only have to remove to the other in order to be able to obtain
foreign support.
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the
Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 193 (1957), quoted in KHAN, supra
note 165, at 123.
191 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
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[A] legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to
constitute the juridicial expression of the fact that the individual upon
whom it is conferred, either directly by law or as the result of an act
of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any
other State.'
192
The ICJ also said that in cases where a preference needs to be
made as to "the real and effective nationality," arbitrators look at "the
habitual residence of the individual... the centre of his interests, his
family ties, his participation in public life, [and] attachment shown by
him for a given country and inculcated in his children .... 193 Despite
its recent origin, the theory of dominant-and-effective nationality has
been recognized as a general principle of international law, 94 unlike the
principle of non-responsibility.
As indicated above, in resolving the nationality issue between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Claims Commission concluded that some
individuals did indeed acquire dual nationality.'95 However, the
92 Id. at 23.
113 Id. at 22.
194 Although the theory of dominant-and-effective nationality is generally recognized, there is some
dispute as to whether it has acquired the status of customary law. Ian Brownlie, for example,
argues that the theory of dominant-and-effective nationality is a general principle of international
law and should be recognized as such. See BROWNLIE, supra note 184, at 19. Others offer a
more cautious endorsement. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 185, at 728. Case No. A/18 of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal "represents the most affirmative statement to date that the
applicable rule of international law with regard to dual nationals is that of dominant and effective
nationality." Notes, supra note 185, at 622 (citing Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Decision
in Case No. A/18, 23 I.L.M., 489, 497-99). In Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal held that "the Tribunal had jurisdiction (a) over claims against Iran by
dual Iran-United States nationals when the dominant and effective nationality of the Claimant is
that of the United States and (b) over claims against the United States by dual Iran-United States
nationals when the dominant and effective nationality of the Claimant is that of Iran." Award
No. 31-157-2 (Mar. 29, 1983), reprinted in 2 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRiB. REP. 157, 166 (1983). In fact,
the Tribunal added a "caveat" to this principle because it recognized that some claimants might
attempt to seek redress as U.S. nationals for rights that they had acquired solely because of their
Iranian nationality. Nancy Amoury Combs, Toward A New Understanding of Abuse of
Nationality in Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
27, 28 (1999). In such instances, the Tribunal looked at two fundamental questions: (1) whether
the ownership of the property in question was reserved by law to Iranian nationals and (2) the
manner of the claimant's acquisition of such property. Id.
... EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 51 (2004). The Commission
considered the effects of this determination to be in two different groups: persons who were
expelled from urban and rural areas and persons who chose to join family members who were
expelled. See id. S[ 80-97.
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Commission did not deem it necessary to determine the dominant-and-
effective nationality of the dual nationals, mainly because the issue of
legal standing had already been determined by the Algiers Agreement.'96
Rather, the Commission followed a completely different, perhaps
unprecedented, line of inquiry because the issue was whether Ethiopia
had in fact engaged in unlawful denationalization of its own nationals.'97
Ironically, the claimant was another state whose nationality was held by
the represented individuals.'98 If it were not for the Algiers Agreement,
under international law discussed above, Eritrea would have had to prove
that it was the source of the dominant-and-effective nationality in order
to present a claim against Ethiopia. Even then, the claim would have
been exceedingly strange because it would have to allege that, Eritrea, as
the repository of the dominant-and-effective nationality, would seek
compensation on behalf of the same individuals who were deprived of
their non-dominant nationality by Ethiopia. That strange option was
foreclosed by the Algiers Agreement. The facts of this case were
unprecedented, and as indicated above, in determining the issues that
arose out of these facts, the Commission engaged in a creative
application of existing norms and contributed its own methods of
resolving claims against a state on behalf of individual claimants whose
nationality was at issue.
B. APPLICABLE LAW
The Algiers Agreement provides that the Commission shall
adjudicate claims that "result from violations of international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other
violations of international law.""' The Agreement excludes from the
Commission's jurisdiction "claims arising from the cost of military
operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of force, except
196 See Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5, 9 ("In appropriate cases, each party may file
claims on behalf of persons of Ethiopian or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals. Such
claims shall be considered by the Commission on the same basis as claims submitted on behalf
of that party's nationals."). In arbitral proceedings, parties ordinarily agree to certain
jurisdictional matters. Though unprecedented, this provision was endorsed by the Commission.
In fact, even the doctrine of non-responsibility recognizes waiver by mutual consent. See H.
Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REV. 438, 457 (1947), cited in KHAN,
supra note 165, at 123.
197 See EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, U 57-58.
198 Id. 63.
199 Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5 1.
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to the extent that such claims involve violations of international
humanitarian law.""'' The Algiers Agreement further mandates that "[i]n
considering claims, the Commission shall apply relevant rules of
international law."' 0' Relying on Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, the Commission's rules of
procedure identified the relevant rules as:
(1) International conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the parties;
(2) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
(3) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
[and]
(4) Judicial and arbitral decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
20 2
In addition, the parties did not dispute that the armed conflict
that occurred between them was an international armed conflict and that
the applicable laws relating to international armed conflicts applied. 3
During the proceedings, international humanitarian law would prove to
be the key source of law.2°4
By way of comparison, the applicable substantive rules of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal are stated more generally as "[t]he
Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying
such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international
law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account
relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances."0 5 Thus, in terms of the applicable law, it appears that
200 Id. art. 5 1.
20 Id. art. 5 13. It is important to note that as described above, in Eritrea's Civilians Claims, the
Commission in fact looked at Ethiopia's 1930 nationality law in reaching its conclusion. See
EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, In 43, 46,59 (2004).
202 See EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, T 31 (2003).
203 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, I 13, 14 (2004); EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's
Claim 5, 22 (2004).
204 See EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5, 24 (2004) (Norms derived from international
humanitarian law "were the central element of the Parties' legal relationships during the conflict,
and both Parties drew upon them heavily in framing their cases.").
205 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 9, art. V.
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the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal enjoys more latitude and
flexibility than the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission because the
Tribunal was essentially empowered to determine the law that applied.
Indeed, in interpreting the provision dealing with the applicable law, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal stated that it was given extraordinary
latitude in choosing from among a variety of sources of law, including
municipal laws and general principles of international public and private
laws."°
With respect to the applicable law for the adjudication of claims
by the UNCC, the Governing Council Rules state that
In considering the claims, Commissioners will apply Security
Council Resolution 867 (1991) and other relevant Security Council
resolutions, the criteria established by the Governing Council for
particular categories of claims, and any pertinent decisions of the
Governing Council. In addition, where necessary, Commissioners
shall apply other relevant rules of international law.
20 7
Thus, although general principles of international law are
important sources of law for all three tribunals, there is a clear emphasis
on international humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions,
in the establishment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission.
Several issues arose during the proceedings concerning
applicable-law issues. Three of the key issues are addressed below,
namely the Commission's findings that (1) customary international law
as reflected by the Geneva Conventions was the primary source of law
for the proceedings; (2) recently developed international landmine
conventions create only treaty obligations and do not yet reflect
customary international law; and (3) international humanitarian law and
international human rights law concurrently apply during armed conflict.
Each of these issues is discussed in turn below.
206 David J. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of International Claims Tribunals,
in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 161, 176 (Mark W. Janis ed.,
1992).
207 U.N. Comp. Comm'n, Governing Council, Decision Taken by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission at the 27th Meeting, Sixth Session Held on 26 June
1992 art. 31, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10 (June 26, 1992), available at http://www2.
unog.ch/uncc/.
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1. CUSTOMARY LAW As REFLECTED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
A significant issue arose regarding the applicable law in the
prisoner-of-war proceedings. Although the most obvious source of law
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war was Geneva Convention III,
and both Eritrea and Ethiopia relied on and cited this instrument
extensively during the proceedings,2"8 Eritrea did not accede to the
Geneva Convention until August 14, 2000, well after active hostilities
had come to an end.2°  This timing led to disagreement between the
parties over its applicability.2t °
Eritrea had been part of Ethiopia when the latter signed all four
of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and ratified them in 1969.2"' As
such, the conventions were in force in Ethiopia when Eritrea achieved its
independence in 1993.212 The Commission, however, found that Eritrea
had not automatically succeeded to the Geneva Conventions "desirable
though such succession would be as a general matter" given that "senior
Eritrean officials made clear that Eritrea did not consider itself bound by
the Geneva Conventions" following independence." 3 This finding was
buttressed by the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) also did not consider Eritrea to be bound by the Geneva
Conventions prior to its accession to those treaties in 2000214 and that
Eritrea did not permit the ICRC to access its prisoner-of-war camps.
215
For the same reasons, the Commission further held that Eritrea was not
bound by the Geneva Conventions by virtue of Article 2 (common to the
four conventions), which provides that a party to the Geneva
Conventions "shall ... be bound by the Convention in relation to the
[party not bound by the conventions], if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof. 216
208 See EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 32 (2004).
209 Accession to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 by Eritrea,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htm/57JQQH (last visited June 15, 2007).





215 See id. 137.
216 See id. [ 36-37. The Commission also rejected an argument set forth by Ethiopia that Eritrea's
accession to the Geneva Conventions was made retroactive to the period covering the conflict by
virtue of Article 5, Paragraph 1, of the Algiers Agreement, which referenced the application of
the Geneva Conventions to the proceedings of the Claims Commission. Id. 42.
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Rather than finding no applicable law, however, the Commission
concluded that customary international law governed the relations
between Eritrea and Ethiopia with respect to prisoners of war during the
conflict and that "for most purposes, 'the distinction between customary
law regarding POWs and the Geneva Convention III is not
significant."'"1 7 The Commission noted that the question of "the extent
to which the[] provisions [of the Geneva Conventions] have become part
of customary international law arises today only rarely" but observed that
the Geneva Conventions were "concluded for the purpose of creating a
treaty law for the parties to the convention and for the related purpose of
codifying and developing customary international law that is applicable
to all nations."2"8 The Commission found support for the conclusion that
the Geneva Conventions had "largely become expressions of customary
international law" in the Nuclear Weapons decision of the International
Court of Justice, UN documents, and the writings of preeminent
international legal scholars.2"9  The Commission noted that this
proposition had achieved "nearly universal acceptance" and that there
was authority for the general proposition that rules pertaining to
international humanitarian law achieved customary status more rapidly
than other rules.22 Having found that the Geneva Conventions largely
reflected customary international law, the Commission concluded that
"[w]henever either Party asserts that a particular relevant provision of
those Conventions should not be considered part of customary
international law at the relevant time, the Commission will decide that
question, and the burden of proof will be on the asserting Party. 221
One of the specific claims in which this finding played a
significant role was Ethiopia's claim against Eritrea for refusing to allow
217 Id. 38 (quoting Eritrea's Claim 17, Prisoners of War, Counter Memorial to Eritrea's Claim 17
Memorial at 19); EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 28 (2003). See
generally Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 818
(2005) (discussing customary international law issues).
218 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 39 (2003). The Commission's observation
regarding the rarity of the issue finds support from other authorities, but this point makes the
Commission's finding regarding the applicability of customary international law all the more
remarkable. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 217, at 817 ("In an era when international legal
principles are increasingly codified in multilateral conventions, the overall importance of
customary law has arguably eroded.").
2'9 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 40 (2003) (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 79 (July 8)).
220 id.
221 Id. 41. See also Meron, supra note 195, at 819 n. 19.
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the ICRC to send delegates to visit Ethiopian prisoner-of-war camps in
Eritrea during the conflict, including the period prior to Eritrea's
accession to the Geneva Conventions in August 2000.222 Although
Eritrea argued that ICRC visits were a treaty-based right stemming from
Geneva Convention III and that such rights were procedural and had not
attained customary status,223 the Commission observed that not only did
the ICRC not agree with this position, "the ICRC 'has played an
indispensable humanitarian role in every armed conflict for more than a
century." 224 As such, the Commission concluded that:
[It could not] agree with Eritrea's argument that provisions of the
Convention requiring external scrutiny of the treatment of POWs and
access to POWs by the ICRC are mere details or simply
implementing procedural provisions that have not, in half a century,
become part of customary international law. These provisions are an
essential part of the regime for protecting POWs that has developed
in international practice, as reflected in Geneva Convention III.
These requirements are, indeed, "treaty-based" in the sense that they
are articulated in the Convention; but, as such, they incorporate past
practices that had standing of their own in customary law, and they
are of such importance for the prospects of compliance with the law
that it would be irresponsible for the Commission to consider them
inapplicable as customary international law.225
Consequently, the Commission held Eritrea liable for failing to
permit ICRC visits prior to August 2000 even though it had not yet
ratified Geneva Convention 111.226
The Commission continued to apply the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions as a reflection of customary international law
throughout the course of the proceedings and expanded this approach to
other international legal instruments. In consideration of the parties'
War Front claims, the Commission found that (1) the Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 and its
annexed Regulations and (2) the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
222 EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 9H 55-62 (2003).
223 Id. 156.
224 Id. U 57, 60 (quoting HOWARD S. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 312 (1978)).
225 ld. 161.
226 See id. 62. This violation also included Eritrea's refusal to permit the ICRC to register
prisoners of war, to interview them without witnesses present, and to provide them with
customary relief and services. Id.
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Conventions of 1977 had achieved customary international law status.2 7
Although it had no practical consequence with respect to the matters
pending before the Commission, the Commission was slightly more
circumspect regarding the customary status of Protocol I, observing that
"most" but not all "of the provisions of Protocol I were expressions of
customary international humanitarian law. ' 22 However, the Commission
confirmed in one award that it believed that Article 75 of Protocol I,
which "articulates fundamental guarantees applicable to all 'persons who
are in the power of a Party to the conflict who do not benefit from more
favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol,"' had
achieved customary status.229 Similarly, the Commission noted that
provisions of Protocol I relating to aerial bombardments-Articles 48,
51, 52, 57, and 58-had similarly become customary norms of
international law:
The provisions of Geneva Protocol I [relating to aerial
bombardments] cited by the Parties represent the best and most recent
efforts of the international community to state the law on the
protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities.
The Commission believes that those provisions reflect a generally
shared view that some of the practices of the Second World War,
such as target area bombing of cities, should be outlawed for the
future, and the Commission considers them to express customary
international humanitarian law.
230
There was only one example of a party arguing that a specific
provision of an international legal instrument had not attained customary
status following the Commission's handling of the issue in the prisoner-
of-war proceedings. Ethiopia argued in its defense to an aerial
bombardment claim, made by Eritrea for the targeting of a water
reservoir, that Article 54 of Protocol I (which provides for the protection
of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population) "was a
new development in 1977 that had not become a part of customary
227 See, e.g., EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 16, 17 (2004); EECC, Civilians Claims,
Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 29 (2004); EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5,
25 (2004).
22 EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5, 25 (2004).
29 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claim 15, 16,23 & 27-32, 30 (2004).
230 EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13,
14, 21, 25 & 26, 95 (2005). See also EECC, Western & Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia's Claims I &
3, 25 (2005); EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 110 (2004).
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international humanitarian law by the 1998-2000 war. 12 3 ' The
Commission rejected this argument, observing that:
The Commission recognizes the difficulty it faces in deciding this
question, as there have been less than three decades for State practice
relating to Article 54 to develop since its adoption in 1977. Article
54 represented a significant advance in the prior law when it was
included in the Protocol in 1977, so it cannot be presumed that it had
become part of customary international humanitarian law more than
20 years later. However, the Commission also notes the compelling
humanitarian nature of that limited prohibition, as well as States'
increased emphasis on avoiding unnecessary injury and suffering by
civilians resulting from armed conflict. The Commission also
considers highly significant the fact that none of the 160 States that
have become Parties to the Protocol has made any reservation or
statement of interpretation rejecting or limiting the binding nature of
that prohibition .... The United States has not yet ratified Geneva
Protocol I, but the Commission notes with interest that the United
States Annotated Supplement (1997) to its Naval Handbook (1995)
makes the significant comment that the rule prohibiting the
intentional destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population for the specific purpose of denying the civilian
population of their use is a "customary rule" accepted by the United
States and codified by Article 54, paragraph 2, of Protocol I. While
the Protocol had not attained universal acceptance by the time these
attacks occurred in 1999 and 2000, it had been very widely accepted.
The Commission believes that, in those circumstances, a treaty
provision of a compelling humanitarian nature that has not been
questioned by any statements of reservation or interpretation and is
not inconsistent with general State practice in the two decades since
the conclusion of the treaty may reasonably be considered to have
come to reflect customary international humanitarian law.
232
Another example of the Commission's consideration of
customary law as reflected in international legal instruments was its
imposition of liability on Ethiopia for the destruction of an obelisk
named the Stela of Matara, believed to be about 2,500 years old.233 The
231 EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13,
14, 21, 25 & 26, 103 (2005).
232 EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13,
14, 21, 25 & 26, IJ 104-105 (2005). Although it found Ethiopia liable for targeting the water
reservoir, the Commission concluded that the finding of liability was sufficient satisfaction for
the violation because no the reservoir was not hit and no damage occurred. See id. 1 105; see
also ICRC, JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005) (concluding that a broader prohibition than the
one stated in Article 54(2) has become customary law).
233 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 107-114 (2004).
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Commission concluded that Ethiopia, as the occupying power of the area
around the obelisk when it was destroyed, was responsible for the
damage,234 and based its decision on customary humanitarian law
because the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural
Property was not applicable between the parties.235 The Commission
noted that the deliberate destruction of historic monuments is a violation
of Article 56 of the Hague Regulations, which, as discussed above, the
Commission characterized as a customary norm of international law.236
Moreover, the Commission stated that the obelisk was civilian property
protected under Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 52 of
Protocol I.237
2. LANDMINES: TREATY BASED OBLIGATIONS
In contrast to its findings with respect to the Geneva
Conventions, Hague Conventions and Regulations, and Protocol I, the
Commission held that (1) the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; (2) the
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
211 ld. 112.
235 Id. 1 113.
236 Id. See Hague Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 56 ("All seizures of, destruction or willful
damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.").
237 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 113; Geneva Convention IV Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 ("Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or other public authorities, or
social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations."); see also Protocol 1, supra note 1, art. 52
("Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects
which are not military objectives .. "). The Commission further noted that the application of
Article 53 of Protocol 1, which provides for the protection of cultural objects and places of
worship, was uncertain because its negotiating history suggested that it was intended to protect
only a few monuments of particular significance such as the Acropolis in Athens and St. Peter's
Basilica in Rome. EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 113 (2004); see
also Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 53 ("[Ilt is prohibited: (a) To commit any acts of hostility
directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b) To use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) To make such objects the object of reprisals."). The language of this provision does not,
however, contain any suggestion that its applicability is limited by geography or historical
prominence. Ultimately, it is not clear from the Commission's decision whether it found a
violation of this provision.
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Traps and Other Devices ("Protocol II of 1980"), and that Protocol as
amended on May 3, 1996; and (3) the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction had not achieved status as customary norms of
international law because these "treaties have been concluded so recently
and the practice of States has been so varied and episodic that it is
impossible to hold that any of the resulting treaties constituted an
expression of customary international humanitarian law applicable
during the armed conflict between the Parties. 2 38 As such, they are not
applicable in the absence of treaty obligation. As neither of the parties
were parties to these conventions, the Commission held that the
obligations that they set forth were not operational between them.239
Nonetheless, recognizing the substantial harm that even the
lawful defensive use of landmines can cause, the Commission
emphasized the importance of the rapid development of these
international conventions restricting or prohibiting the future use of
landmines. 40 The Commission also observed that some provisions of
Protocol II did express customary international law norms, including the
provisions relating to the recording of mine fields and the indiscriminate
use of mines.24" '
3. CONCURRENT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The concurrent application of humanitarian law and human
rights law242 is often necessary when human rights issues arise in conflict
238 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 24 (2004).
239 id.
240 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 51 (2004).
241 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 24 (2004). Without specifying any
relevant provision of an international legal instrument, the Commission also concluded that the
use of landmines to protect fixed positions was a lawful use of these weapons under customary
international law. EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 50 (2004).
242 Some experts argue that there is a close relationship between human rights and humanitarian law
norms and they in fact overlap to a large extent. See, e.g., Dale Stephens, Human Rights and
Armed Conflict-The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 1 (2001); Meron, supra note 217. See also
Michael Matheson, The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417, 423 (1997) (explaining the view that the two sets of
rules have fundamental philosophical distinctions, and that such distinctions must be
maintained).
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situations that are mainly regulated by humanitarian law.243 The two sets
of norms have significant commonality because they both concern the
protection of individuals.2" There are, however, important distinctions.
In simplistic terms, while human rights law is designed to regulate
peacetime circumstances, humanitarian law is designed to regulate
wartime circumstances. 245  Inevitably, however, certain wartime
circumstances demand the application of human rights norms. A good
example of the concurrent application of these norms in wartime
circumstances is the set of denationalization and unlawful expulsion
claims that Eritrea brought against Ethiopia.2 4 6
As discussed in Section III.A.4. above, the Commission
determined that the affected individuals were dual nationals of both
Eritrea and Ethiopia. The next question for the Commission was whether
Ethiopia's expulsion of some of the dual nationals was lawful. 247 To
answer this question, the Commission had to weigh rights and duties
enshrined under both human rights and humanitarian laws. 248
The arguments set forth by the parties are summarized as
follows: Ethiopia argued that customary international law (presumably
including human rights law) gave it the authority to revoke Ethiopian
nationality from individuals who had acquired another nationality.249
Eritrea, on the other hand, argued that such a prerogative is not without
limitations and relied on Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,25 ° which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of
nationality. 21  The Commission acknowledged the applicability of the
laws cited by both parties; however, it stated that the question would be
whether Ethiopia's actions were arbitrary in light of the wartime
212circumstances, which are governed by international humanitarian law.
The Commission observed that in determining whether the
deprivation of nationality and subsequent expulsion was arbitrary it
243 See HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 9.
244 id.
245 Id.
246 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 (2004).
2"7 Id. art. VII.
248 See id. 57.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, U.N GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A1810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
252 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 58-64 (2004).
Vol. 25, No. I
Wisconsin International Law Journal
would look at several factors, including "whether the action had a basis
in law; whether it resulted in persons being rendered stateless; and
whether there were legitimate reasons for it to be taken given the totality
of the circumstances. '53
With respect to the basis in law, the Commission concluded that
Ethiopia's 1930 Nationality Law was legally sufficient because its
provisions were comparable to the laws of many nations and not contrary
to international law,254 essentially human rights law. The Commission
added that the application of this law does not generally result in
statelessness because its application depends on acquisition of another
nationality.25  Most importantly, however, the Commission held that
Ethiopia's deprivation of its nationality to those who also held Eritrean
nationality and showed some allegiance to Eritrea was not unlawful. 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission weighed the totality of the
wartime circumstances.2 7 It concluded that the evidence showed that
some dual nationals were considered threats to national security by
Ethiopian authorities because of their participation in Eritrean
organizations and collection of funds for the Eritrean state. 8 It also said
that Ethiopia's screening process, although it fell short of recognized
standards, was not arbitrary or contrary to international law given the
exceptional wartime circumstances.5 9
253 id. T 60.
254 See id. T 61.
255 Id. T 62.
256 Id. 172.
257 Id. -H 65-71.
258 The court said that:
The first [organization] was the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice ("PFDJ").
The evidence showed that the PFDJ was the ruling political party in Eritrea, but it was
more than a western-style political party.... The evidence showed that the PFDJ
maintained a structure of local groups at numerous locations in Ethiopia, which were
used to promote the interests of Eritrea.
Id. 9 67. See also id. 9 68 ("Ethiopia's screening process also focused on persons active in the
Eritrean Community Associations. The Community Associations were less overtly political than
the PFDJ. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that they raised funds to support Eritrea and
promoted nationalistic solidarity among their members.").
'59 Id. T 72. See id. T 70 ("Eritrea's evidence was consistent with Ethiopia's claim that the process
involved deliberation and selection of individuals. Eritrean witnesses regularly described
Ethiopian security personnel coming to their residences or places of work seeking them
individually by name."). Compare with the following:
The process was hurried. Detainees received no written notification, and some
claimed they were never told what was happening. Ethiopia contended that detainees
could orally apply to security officials seeking release. The record includes some
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Thus, it is apparent that the Commission applied a combination
of human rights and humanitarian law principles in arriving at this
conclusion. Human rights law allows derogations from the general
principles under limited circumstances, but, even then, it provides for
important safeguards. 2' For example, in case of deprivation of
nationality, there must be a fair hearing by an independent and impartial
agency. 26! The issue of the sufficiency of such legal process would
declaration of persons who were released, but it also includes senior Ethiopian
witnesses' statements suggesting that there were few appeals.
Id. 71.
260 These derogations and safeguards include:
1) In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are
not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin.
3) Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation
shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further
communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it
terminates such derogation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art.4, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171. See also European Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
15, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (providing for similar derogations from international
obligations); American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (providing for similar derogation of international obligations)..
261 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] art. 8, G.A. Res. 217A at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law."); id. art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.").
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be
expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law
and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be
allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by,
and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or
persons especially designated by the competent authority.
ICCPR, supra note 260, art. 13. See also Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 8(4),
989 U.N.T.S. 175, entered into force Dec. 13, 1975 ("A Contracting State shall not exercise a
power of deprivation permitted by paragraphs 2 or 3 of this article except in accordance with
law, which shall provide for the person concerned the right to a fair hearing by a court or other
independent body.").
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essentially be a factual issue. It is, however, argued generally that under
humanitarian law there is no express prohibition of the expulsion of
enemy aliens when it occurs for security reasons. 62 Agreeing with this
proposition, the Commission stated that international humanitarian law
"gives belligerents broad power to expel nationals of the enemy State
from their territory during a conflict." '263 In reaching its conclusion, the
Commission analyzed the circumstances surrounding the conflict in light
of the standards set forth by both human rights and humanitarian laws
262 See, e.g., GERALD DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 36 (1958) (noting that the customary
right of a state to expel all enemy aliens at the outset of a conflict was not abrogated by the
Geneva Civilians Convention of 1949 and that such expulsion is not condemned by customary
international law). Compare with ICRC Commentary on Article 45 of Geneva Convention IV,
which states:
Any movement of protected persons to another State, carried out by the Detaining
Power on an individual or collective basis, is considered as a transfer for the purposes
of Article 45. The term 'transfer', for example, may mean internment in the territory
of another Power, repatriation, the returning of protected persons to their country of
residence or their extradition. The Convention makes provision for all these
possibilities. On the other hand there is no provision concerning deportation (in
French expulsion), the measure taken by a State to remove an undesirable foreigner
from its territory. In the absence of any clause stating that deportation is to be
regarded as a form of transfer, this Article would not appear to raise any obstacle to
the right of Parties to the conflict to deport aliens in individual cases when State
security demands such action. However, practice and theory both make this right a
limited one: the mass deportation at the beginning of a war, of all the foreigners in the
territory of a belligerent cannot, for instance, be permitted.
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, COMMENTARY IV, GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 266 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
International Committee of the Red Cross 1958).
263 The Commission noted:
The right of states to expel aliens is generally recognized. It matters not whether the
alien is on a temporary visit or has settled down for professional, business or other
purposes on its territory, having established his domicile there. On the other hand,
while a state has a broad discretion in exercising its right to expel an alien, its
discretion is not absolute. Thus, by customary international law it must not abuse its
right by acting arbitrarily in taking its decision to expel an alien, and it must act
reasonably in the manner in which it effects an expulsion. Beyond this, however,
customary international law provides no detailed rules regarding expulsion and
everything accordingly depends upon the merits of the individual case. Theory and
practice correctly make a distinction between expulsion in time of hostilities and in
time of peace. A belligerent may consider it convenient to expel all hostile nationals
residing, or temporarily staying, within its territory: although such a measure may be
very hard on individual aliens, it is generally accepted that such expulsion is
justifiable.
EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 81 (2004) (quoting
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 413 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1997)).
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and determined that Ethiopia's expedited procedures fell short of human
rights standards but were justified under humanitarian law because of the
wartime exigencies." Indeed, the set of unique issues presented in this
case offered an excellent opportunity for the analysis of the simultaneous
application of these important bodies of law.
C. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
As discussed above, the Commission adopted its own rules of
procedure and evidence based on the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.265  This section discusses the
Commission's resolution of evidentiary issues in its various proceedings.
1. STANDARD OF PROOF
The Commission adopted a high standard of evidentiary proof
for the proceedings before it, concluding that the parties must establish
facts with clear and convincing evidence based on the totality of the
evidence and show that violations occurred in a frequent or pervasive
manner. With respect to one important set of claims, i.e., allegations of
rape, the Commission worked within this standard to produce a slightly
altered approach that took into account characteristics of this violation
that likely would not be accounted for under the general standard.
a. Clear and Convincing Evidence of Violations That Occurred on a
Frequent or Pervasive Basis Based on the Totality of the Evidence
Although the Commission's Rules of Procedure state that
"[elach party shall have the burden of proving the facts it relies on to
264 The dual application of human rights and humanitarian law was important because the right to
expel enemy aliens is dependent on the ability to accord them due process. The right to expel
during wartime emanates from humanitarian law but the safeguard mainly emanates from human
rights law. For example, the Humanitarian Law Handbook, on which the Commission relied,
states:
Art. 45, para. 4 GC IV contains a universally applicable principle of international law.
In this connection, attention is drawn to Article 13 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which stipulates an orderly procedure for expulsion of
aliens and in particular a procedure enabling the persons concerned to present their
own case. This rule should be applied generally.
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, § 589.4 at 287.
261 Infra Part Hl.B.
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support its claim or defense" and that "[t]he Commission shall determine
the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence
offered," '266 the rules do not "articulate the quantum or degree of proof
that a party must present to meet this burden of proof." '267 The
Commission noted that these characteristics of the rules were "reflect[ive
of] common international practice. 68 Thus, the Commission was left
with the challenge of articulating the applicable evidentiary standards
that it would apply.
The Commission found that the standards argued for by both of
the parties during the first round of proceedings were high standards that
took into account the seriousness of the violations at issue and the fact
that states-not individuals or corporate entities-were parties to the
proceedings.269 As such, the Commission concluded that "[p]articularly
in light of the gravity of some of the claims advanced, the Commission
will require clear and convincing evidence in support of its findings.""27
Thus, the standard was set somewhere between the standard of
probability common in civil court proceedings in the United States and
the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" common in U.S. criminal
proceedings. Indeed, the Commission specifically noted that although
some of the allegations might amount to criminal acts if proven, the
Commission was not a criminal court and would not adopt an evidentiary
standard appropriate for criminal proceedings.27" ' Accordingly, the
Commission observed that "[t]he possibility that particular findings may
involve very serious matters does not change the international law rules
to be applied or fundamentally transform the quantum of evidence
required." '272 On the other hand, the Commission noted in subsequent
decisions that it "recognizes that this standard of proof and the existence
of conflicting evidence may result in fewer findings of liability than
either Party expects. The Awards on these Claims must be understood in
that unavoidable context." '273
266 EECC Rules of Procedure, supra note 38, art. 14.
267 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 44 (2003).
268 id.
269 See id. 45.
270 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 46 (2003) (emphasis added). See, e.g., EECC,
Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 20 (2004).
271 E.g., EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 38 (2003).
272 id.
273 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 7 (2004). See, e.g., EECC, Civilians
Claims, Eritrea's Claim 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 35 (2004).
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Consistent with this view of its function, the Commission also
concluded that the parties must establish that violations occurred not on
an individual and isolated basis but in a "frequent or pervasive"
manner. 2 11 Specifically, the Commission stated that it "does not see its
task to be the determination of liability of a Party for each individual
incident of illegality suggested by the evidence. Rather, it is to
determine liability for serious violations of the law by the Parties, which
are usually illegal acts or omissions that were frequent or pervasive and
consequently affected significant numbers of victims. 2 5  The
Commission concluded that "[t]hese parameters are dictated by the limit
of what is feasible for the two Parties to brief and argue and for the
Commission to determine in light of the time and resources made
available by the Parties. 276  The Algiers Agreement imposed several
restrictions on the proceedings that likely influenced the Commission's
finding. For example, the Algiers Agreement stipulates that the
commission must "endeavor" to complete the proceedings within three
years of the closing date for filing the claims or four years of the
enactment of the agreement. 277 As discussed in the following section,
however, the Commission did not find the "frequent or pervasive"
standard to be "an invariable requirement. 278
In articulating its evidentiary standards, the Commission also
stressed the importance of the cumulative weight or totality of the
evidence. In this regard, the Commission observed that:
The consistent and cumulative character of much of the Parties'
evidence was of significant value to the Commission in making its
factual judgments. When the totality of the evidence offered by the
Claimant provided clear and convincing evidence of a violation-i.e.,
a prima facie case-the Commission carefully examined the evidence
offered by the Respondent (usually in the form of a declaration or
274 EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 54 (2003); EECC, Western Front, Aerial
Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, 91 (2005).
275 EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 1 54 (2003).
276 id.
277 Algiers Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5(12). Notably, this requirement was stated in suggestive
terms rather than mandatory terms. The liability phase itself has taken more than three years to
complete.
278 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 1 37 (2004); EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's
Claim 5, 1 85 (2004).
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camp records) to determine whether it effectively rebutted the
Claimant's proof.
279
This approach appears to be a sound one given the general
reliability of corroborating evidence. In some respects, the
Commission's standards are in accord with the standards used by other
international tribunals, but in other respects, it diverges from them. For
example, the Commission's "clear and convincing" standard appears to
comport with the standard adopted by the International Court of Justice
in the Congo case, where the ICJ stated that "[t]he Court must first
establish which relevant facts it regards as having been convincingly
established by the evidence . ."0 In contrast, however, a cumulative-
weight approach does not appear to have been adopted by the ICJ in the
Congo case.251
The Iran-United States Claims tribunal adopted the UNCITRAL
rules of evidence in its totality because of the commercial nature of most
of the claims.2 "2  The application of the UNCITRAL rules of evidence
often leads to the common evidentiary standard of "preponderance of the
evidence". Accordingly, this was the standard adopted by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, which has faced serious problems with
respect to the scarcity of direct evidence.283 Thus, the manner in which it
handled this challenge was fundamentally different from the manner in
which the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Tribunal handled the same issue.
While the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission effectively raised the
standards of proof-or at least adopted the baseline standard-for
findings of liability as discussed above, the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal lowered the standard of proof in the face of scarcity. 2' As such,
279 EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 43 (2003). Although the Commission
occasionally referred to the parties' burden to establish a prima facie case based on the
cumulative weight of the evidence throughout the proceedings, this standard was articulated only
in the partial awards regarding prisoners of war. See id.
280 See Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda)
(Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), 72 (emphasis added), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/ico-judgments/ico-judgment_20051219.pdf.
281 See, e.g., id.
282 See Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., Rules of Procedure, art. 24, available at http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-
rules.pdf (cited in ALDRICH, supra note 1, at 332).
283 See Aldrich, supra note 1, at 332 ("In practice, the Tribunal was conscious of the practical
difficulties facing the parties in finding and producing evidence.").
284 For example, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Gov. of the Islamic Rep. of Iran, the Tribunal held
that if a purchaser fails to object to the invoiced amount within a reasonable time following
receipt, and not until the proceedings are instituted, the burden shifted to the buyer to prove that
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among other principles, the IUSCT relied on presumptions, inferences,
and burden shifting under different circumstances.285
b. The Rape Exception
One of the most serious allegations that attracted the
Commission's attention was rape, which drew separate and general
comments by the Commission each time it was addressed. 86 Although
the Commission commended both parties for the absence of any
suggestion of rape being used as an "instrument of war,"'287 the
Commission nonetheless found both parties liable for certain limited
violations concerning rape.28 The Commission began its analysis by
recognizing that there was no disagreement between the parties that rape
is a violation of customary international humanitarian law as enshrined in
the Geneva Conventions.289 The Commission then proceeded to address
it did not owe the amount of the invoices. Partial Award No. 145-35-3, 17 (Aug. 6, 1984),
reprinted in 7 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 181, 190-91 (cited in Aldrich, supra note 1, at 334).
285 See generally Aldrich, supra note 1, at 333.
286 See EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, I 139-142 (2003); see also EECC, Central
Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 1 36-43 (2004); EECC, Central Front, Ethopia's
Claim 2, 911 34-40 (2004); EECC, Civilians Claims, Ethopia's Claim 5, (91 83-90 (2004); EECC,
Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21,
25 & 26, 1 74-84 (2005); EECC, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia's Claims 1, 3, I 49-56,
68-69 (2005).
287 E.g., EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 36 (2004).
288 Eritrea was held liable for failing to take effective measures to prevent rape in Irob Wereda on
the Central Front. EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 91 39 (2004). Eritrea was also held
liable for failure to prevent rape in Elidar and Dalul Weredas on the Eastern Front. EECC,
Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia's Claims 1, 3, 91968-70 (2005). Ethiopia was held liable for
the same violation in Senafe Town on the Central Front. EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims
2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 91 42, 80-8 (2004). Ethiopia was also held liable for violations in Barentu and
Tesseney Towns on the Western Front. EECC, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related
Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26,9183 (2005).
289 E.g., EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 91 37 (2004). The Commission
cited to the following provisions. The first is Common Article 3(1), which, inter alia, prohibits
"violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment,
torture.., outrage on personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment ......
Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 3 1 1. The second provision is Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV,
which states that:
Protected Persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour, their families rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their
manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be
protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults
and public curiosity. Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their
honour in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any form of indecent
assault.
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the evidentiary challenges that arose given the nature of this violation."9
The Commission observed that heightened cultural sensitivities in both
Eritrea and Ethiopia made it less likely that victims would come forward
to communicate the rape or sexual abuse they endured, resulting in
available evidence that is "likely to be far less detailed and explicit than
for non-sexual offenses."29' The Commission accepted such sensitivities
as an objective reality and took them into account when considering the
evidence because, in the words of the Commission, "[t]o do otherwise
would be to subscribe to the school of thought, now fortunately eroding,
that rape is inevitable collateral damage in armed conflict." '292
In undertaking this approach to the evidence, the Commission
observed that its earlier enunciated requirement that violations be shown
to have occurred on a frequent or pervasive basis did not apply across the
board. 93 The Commission quoted its earlier language, stressing that its
duty was to "determine liability for serious violations ... which are
usually illegal acts or omissions that were frequent or pervasive . "..."294
In other words, the Commission concluded that rape was of a sufficiently
serious nature to warrant liability without a showing that it occurred in a
frequent or pervasive manner.29 As the Commission put it:
Rape, which by definition involves intentional and grievous harm to
an individual civilian victim, is an illegal act that need not be
frequent to support State responsibility. This is not to say that the
Commission, which is not a criminal tribunal, could or has assessed
government liability for isolated individual rapes or on the basis of
entirely hearsay accounts. What the Commission has done is look for
clear and convincing evidence of several rapes in specific geographic
areas under specific circumstances.296
The Commission explained that the specific areas in which it
found evidence of rapes having occurred were those "where large
numbers of opposing troops were in closest proximity to civilian
Id. art. 27. The third provision is Article 76.1 of Protocol I, which states that "[wiomen shall be
the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution
and any other form of indecent assault." Id. art. 76.
290 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 39 (2004).
291 E.g., id.
292 E.g., id.
293 E.g., id. 40. As the Commission put it, the frequent-or-pervasive requirement was not "an
invariable requirement." Id.
294 E.g., id.
295 Id. T 41.
296 E.g., id.
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populations (disproportionately women, children and the elderly) for the
longest periods of time." '297 The Commission concluded that military
officials were obligated to take special care in such situations:
"[k]nowing, as they must, that such areas pose the greatest risk of
opportunistic sexual violence by troops, Eritrea and Ethiopia were
obliged to impose effective measures, as required by international
humanitarian law, to prevent rape of civilian women.""29
Thus, the Commission was faced with a situation where there
was clear and convincing evidence of incidents of rape in territories
occupied by both parties,299 but the evidence did not show that incidents
were frequent or pervasive." It compensated for this shortcoming,
which, as discussed above, stemmed from the cultural sensitivities
inherent in the region,3"' not by adopting a new standard or altering the
existing standard, but by operating within the standard already
enunciated.302 This approach provides an effective means of addressing a
difficult and important issue and will undoubtedly prove to be one of the
most significant contributions of the Commission to the growth of
international humanitarian law.
2. EVIDENCE USED TO PROVE FACTS
The primary source of evidence that the parties relied on was a
significant number of signed affidavits from persons with personal
knowledge of the events that transpired during the more than two years
of conflict.30 3 In evaluating the evidence, the Commission recognized the
297 E.g., id. 42.
298 Id. While the Commission found both parties responsible for not taking measures to prevent
rape in some specific geographic areas, it did not find such failure in other areas. Id. T[ 4243.
However, the Commission said that in those areas where there was no gross failure, there were
individual instances "deserving of at least criminal investigation." Id. 43.
299 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, T 139-142 (2003). It should be noted that with
respect to some of the rape claims submitted by the parties, the evidence produced was not
considered clear and convincing by the Commission. E.g., id. (denying Eritrea's claim for the
rape of female prisoners of war for insufficient evidence).
'oo See id.
' EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 39 (2004).
302 id.
30' The parties relied heavily on signed declarations. In the POW case, for example, Eritrea
submitted seventy-seven signed declarations in support of its affirmative case, forty-eight of
which were from former prisoners of war and ten of which were from former civilian internees.
EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, T 48 (2003). Likewise, Ethiopia submitted thirty
declarations in support of its affirmative case, all of which were from former prisoners of war.
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importance placed on the signed declarations submitted by the parties. It
stated that in determining the probative value of an affidavit to establish
a violation of international law, it considered the clarity and detail of the
relevant testimony and whether the allegations were corroborated by
testimony in other affidavits or other evidence.3 "4 The Commission also
observed that it relied on the formal affidavits as supplemented by the
testimony at the hearings and other documents in the record, signaling
the importance it assigned to the signed affidavits.3"5
Live testimony by witnesses at the various hearings also played a
remarkable role in the parties' efforts to establish their allegations. 6
The fact witnesses included, among others, former prisoners of war,307
civilian detainees, 3°8 expellees," victims of violence (including shootings
and bombings),31° military commanders,' and security officials. Expert
witnesses included psychiatrists,' medical doctors,3"3 retired U.S. army
generals,314 and various military and explosives experts."
EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 39, 42 (2003). Ethiopia also submitted
numerous claim forms that were "filled in by a former POW or a person writing for him,
responding at varying length to detailed questions regarding conditions and experiences in each
of Eritrea's POW camps." Id. at 1 40. The Commission concluded that the claim forms were "of
uncertain probative value" and did not use "them in arriving at the factual judgments." Id. at
41. For all of the other cases, including the civilian and war front cases, both parties submitted
hundreds of sworn declaration for their respective affirmative and defensive cases. E.g., EECC,
Civilians Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5, 32 (2004).
304 E.g., EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 1 49 (2003).
305 Again, this emphasis on signed declarations should be compared with the ICJ's reliance on
documents in the Congo case. See Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm.
306 The important role of witnesses in these proceedings should be contrasted with the more limited
role played by witnesses before the International Court of Justice [ICJ].
307 EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 44 (2004).
308 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 48 (2003).
309 EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, 1 (2004).
3 0 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 22, 72 (2004).
31 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claim 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, & 22, 28 (2004) (Brigadier General Alemu
Ayele for Ethiopia); EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 22 (2004) (Col. Abraham
Ogbasellassie for Eritrea).
312 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 48 (2003). The health officer was also presented
as an expert witness. Id. 1 48.
313 See id.
314 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claim 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, & 22, 28 (2004) (U.S. Army General (Ret.)
Charles W. Dyke for Ethiopia).
315 Id. 28 (Mr. Henrik Tobeisen and Mr. William Arkin for Eritrea); id. 91 109 (Mr. Laurent
Bouillet for Eritrea); EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 22 (2004) (Major (Ret.) Paul
Noack and Col. (Ret.) Jake Bell).
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Documentary evidence appears to have played a lesser, but still
important, role than that played by testimonial evidence. For example, in
the prisoner of war cases, Eritrea submitted newspaper articles,316 public
statements, medical and hospital records, and expenditure receipts related
to POW camps.317 In the civilian cases, Eritrea also submitted, among
other official records, immigration documents." 8 In the prisoner of war
cases, Ethiopia similarly submitted official declarations, newspaper
articles, training materials, camp regulations, and medical records.3"9 In
the war front claims, both parties relied on various pieces of
documentary evidence, including military records,32 photographs,3 2' and
satellite imagery. 2   The Commission accorded the satellite imagery
particularly strong probative value, mainly because it originated from a
neutral source that was commercially available and showed the condition
of buildings with a reasonable degree of clarity at specific dates.323
Ordinary photographs were also given significant weight in establishing
patterns of destruction.324
Given the fact that the parties were attempting to prove events
that occurred in each other's territory without having access to the
opposite side's territory, the Commission's cumulative evidence
approach appears to be the most workable one to determine what actually
transpired between the parties during the more than two years of armed
conflict.
3. SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
During the course of the proceedings, the Commission faced
numerous peculiar and specific evidentiary issues. Two of the most
important issues were the utilization of confidential reports of the
316 See Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda)
(Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), 68, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
ico/icoframe.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007); Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) (Judgment of May 24), 1 13, available at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/icases/iusir/iusirframe.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
317 EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 48 (2003).
3" EECC, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16,23 & 27-32, 1 32 (2004).
319 EECC, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia's Claim 4, 39 (2003).
320 See, e.g., EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 72 (2004).
321 Id. In 72, 73(4).
322 EECC, Central Front, Eritrea's Claim 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, & 22, 9T 62 (2004).
323 See id. [ 62-64.
324 See EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 73(4) (2004).
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International Committee of the Red Cross and the failure by the parties to
produce evidence known to exist in their custody. These issues are
discussed below.
a. Evidence of the International Committee of the Red Cross
One of the important evidentiary issues addressed by the
Commission was accessibility to confidential evidence under the
authority of the ICRC. The ICRC had visited Ethiopian prisoner of war
camps throughout the conflict and Eritrean prisoner of war camps
beginning in August 2000.325 Accordingly, both parties had in their
possession numerous confidential documents obtained from the ICRC.326
Although the parties sought to provide this evidence to the
Commission-and the Commission wanted to receive it-"[ft]he ICRC
maintained that [this evidence] could not be provided without ICRC
consent, which would not be given." '327 This, even after the president of
the Commission met with senior ICRC officials and offered to review the
evidence "on a restricted or confidential basis if required.3 2 ' The only
documents that the ICRC was willing to permit to be used were those
that were already public.329 The Commission reacted in the following
terms:
325 E.g., EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, T 50 (2003).
326 E.g., id.
311 E.g., id. T[ 51.
328 E.g., id. T 52.
329 E.g., EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 53 (2003). The ICRC's official position on
the confidentiality of its reports is stated as follows:
ICRC believes that the best way that it can prevent or halt torture and ensure decent
conditions of detention is by getting repeated and unrestricted access to prisoners,
talking to them about their problems, and urging the detaining authorities to make any
improvements that may be necessary. The price of this is a policy of confidentiality,
taking up the problems only with the people directly concerned.
International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Frequently Asked Questions, ICRC Doesn 't
Publish Its Reports on Prison Visits-How Can Working Confidentially Be Effective in
Preventing Torture? (Nov. 15, 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/5FMFN8. The ICRC sees two important benefits in keeping the reports
confidential, i.e., as a tool for "negotiating access" and a strong belief in the "power of
persuasion." Id. With respect to "negotiating access," the ICRC states that "[m]ost of the
prisoners ICRC visits (or seeks to visit) are not protected by laws which oblige the authorities to
open the gates-access must be negotiated." Id. With respect to the "power of persuasion," the
ICRC states that its "discreet approach, in which its findings are reported only to the authority
concemed, combined with its professional expertise and neutrality, form the key elements in
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[T]he Commission believes that, in the unique situation here, where
both parties to the armed conflict agreed that these documents should
be provided to the Commission, the ICRC should not have forbidden
them from doing so. Both the Commission and the ICRC share an
interest in the proper and informed application of international
humanitarian law. Accordingly, the Commission must record its
disappointment that the ICRC was not prepared to allow it access to
these materials.
330
Given its unique role, the extent to which the ICRC will be
called on to produce evidence-either documentary or testimonial-will
continue to be an important and evolving issue not only in international
civil arbitration and litigation but before criminal tribunals as well.33 '
b. Inferences Drawn From Failure to Produce Evidence
Given the complexity and sensitivity of some of the issues, the
parties were at times reluctant to produce some important evidence. In at
least one important case, the Commission relied on negative inferences
from non-production of evidence known to exist in the possession of a
party to the dispute. 32 Undisputed facts indicated that on June 5, 1998,
at least one of four Eritrean fighter jets flown that day dropped bombs in
persuading those in power to adopt, where necessary, more humanitarian measures." Id.
Nonetheless, the ICRC sets a limit to its confidentiality principle, stating that
[T]he ICRC might decide to break its rule of silence and/or suspend its operation
under certain extreme circumstances: if, after repeated approaches and requests, the
prisoners' treatment or conditions hasn't improved; if the ICRC's usual procedures
for visits are not respected; if a detaining authority publishes just part of a visit
report ....
Id. The ICRC finally concludes that such decisions would be made taking into account the best
interests of the detainees. Id. Currently, the ICRC relies on three sources of international law for
its privileged exemption from providing evidence in international criminal proceedings: (1) the
International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence (which essentially grants the
ICRC the final authority to decide whether to release its reports on a case-by-case basis); (2)
Prosecutor v. Simic et al., I.C.T.Y. (July 27, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/
trialc3/decision-e/90727EV59549.htm (last visited June 15, 2007), a decision of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], which held that the ICRC enjoys absolute
privilege to withhold its confidential information as a matter of customary international law; and
(3) headquarters agreements, which almost always provide for testimonial privilege in domestic
proceedings. See Gabor Rona, The ICRC Privilege Not to Testify: Confidentiality in Action, 845
INT'L REV. RED CRoss 207 (Mar. 31, 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteengO.nsf/html/59KCR4.
30 E.g., EECC, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17, 53 (2003).
31 See generally Rona, supra note 329 (providing a brief discussion of ICRC's perspective on this
issue).
332 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2 (2004).
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a civilian neighborhood killing civilians, including schoolchildren.333
Ethiopia alleged that the Eritrean air force deliberately targeted civilians
in violation of international law.334 It argued that two separate bombings
targeted the same school compound.335 Eritrea admitted that it caused the
injuries but said that it was accidental.336 It argued that the intended
target was a nearby airport and that only one, not two, of the four flights
deployed to attack the airport accidentally hit the civilian
neighborhood.337
The most important issue that the Commission was asked to
resolve was whether there was only one flight, which may suggest an
accident, or two flights, which may make that assertion doubtful.33 The
Commission thoroughly analyzed the conflicting evidence that the
parties presented. The evidence included written statements from
victims and witnesses of the attacks, live testimony from the deputy
commander of the Eritrean Air Force, a victim of the air attack, and
expert witnesses.339 It also included contemporaneous video footage,
medical records of victims, and news reports from the attack.'o
The Commission deemed the issue of the number of attacks
important because of the extreme odds against two accidental bombings
hitting the exact same location.34" ' To determine this issue, the
Commission considered the evidence and decided that two of Eritrea's
four separate air force flights attacked the civilian neighborhood.342
Despite this conclusion, however, the Commission said that it "was not
convinced that Eritrea deliberately targeted a civilian neighborhood." '343
It added that although the odds seem extreme, such accidental
occurrences are not inconceivable.3" It offered several reasons for its
133 Id. 101. Ethiopia alleged that the bombs were dropped near an Elementary School named
Ayder and the casualties included 53 deaths, including 12 schoolchildren, and 185 wounded,
including 42 schoolchildren. Id.
34 Id. 102.
... Id. 101.
336 Id. 1 102.
"7 Id. 104-05.
... See id. 104.
339 See id. The expert witnesses included U.S. General (Ret.) Charles W. Dyke for Ethiopia and
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conclusion: (1) Given Ethiopia's air superiority, it is unreasonable to
assume that Eritrea would see any advantage in setting precedent by
targeting civilians;345  (2) Eritrea's pilots and aircraft computer
programmers "were utterly inexperienced, and it recognizes the
possibility that, in the confusion of May 5, both computers could have
been loaded with the same inaccurate targeting data";346 (3) it is also
"conceivable that the pilot of the third sortie simply released too early
through either a computer or human error or in an effort to avoid anti-
aircraft fire that the pilots of the previous sorties had reported;""37 and (4)
"it was also conceivable that the pilot of the fourth sortie might have
decided to aim at the smoke resulting from the third sortie." 348
Although the Commission agreed with Eritrea for the reasons
stated above, it did not conclude that Eritrea was without liability. It
held that Eritrea failed to take all feasible precautionary measures to
prevent unintended injuries when choosing its targets in violation of





349 Article 57 of Protocol I provides that:
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify
that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; (iii) refrain
from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated;
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective
is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit.
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two out of three bomb runs to come close to their intended targets clearly
indicate[d] a lack of essential care in conducting them .... ""'
Furthermore, the Commission said that based on the evidence before it, it
was unable to determine why two of the four flights dropped bombs that
hit the civilian neighborhood. 5' The Commission observed that the
critical evidence could have been produced by Eritrea, but it had failed to
produce this evidence.352 Consequently, the Commission concluded that
it was "entitled to draw adverse inferences reinforcing the
conclusions.., that not all feasible precautions were taken by Eritrea in
its conduct of the air strikes." '353
Therefore, the serious conflict in the evidence and complexity of
the wartime circumstances, coupled with non-production of vital
evidence known to exist,354 led the Commission to determine the issues
based largely on inferences and logical analysis.
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a
similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict
shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian
lives and damage to civilian objects.
5. No provision of this article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the
civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 57.
350 EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 110 (2004). The Commission also said that this
failure was compounded by Eritrea's failure to take appropriate actions after the incidents to
prevent future recurrences. The Commission came to this conclusion based on the live testimony
of the Eritrean Deputy Air Force Commander who said that no systematic investigation of the
bombings were subsequently conducted and all efforts of inquiry were limited to questioning one
of the pilots who was believed to have accidentally bombed a civilian target. Id. IT 111-12.
351 See generally id.
.52 Id. 9H 111-12.
... See id. 112.
354 See EECC, Central Front, Ethiopia's Claim 2, 11 (2004) (noting that "Eritrea did not make
available to the Commission any evidence from the pilots and refused to identify them."). One of
the most serious challenges facing tribunals dealing with inter-state claims is the withholding of
evidence that may have national security implications. Because arbitral tribunals lack the
authority to enforce decisions, they are often forced to adjudicate cases based only on the
evidence that is made available to them. This problem is not uncommon. In fact, the Rules of
Procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, on which the Commission's rules of
procedures and evidence are based, envisage the occurrence of such problems. For example,
Article 24 of these rules states that:
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IV. CONCLUSION
Elaborate and well-conceived rules of international humanitarian
law set the standard of treatment of persons involved in and affected by
warfare. The lack of a centralized form of enforcement is a peculiarity
that these standards share with the general body of international law.355
Better enforcement mechanisms are currently in place for norms of
international law dealing with international peace and security. The most
important of all mechanisms of enforcement is enshrined under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter. It authorizes the UN Security Council
to employ coercive measures to protect and restore international peace
and security. In recent times, the threat to international peace has been
broadened to include gross violations of human rights and the
perpetration of serious violations of humanitarian law in times of
international or non-international armed conflicts. The mechanism of
enforcement of such violations has included sanctions,356 the appointment
of commissions of inquiry for the investigation of violations,357 military
intervention,3 8 and authorization of criminal prosecutions. 59 However,
Any time during the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may call upon the
parties to produce documents, exhibits, or other evidence within such a period of time
as the tribunal shall determine. The tribunal shall take note of any refusal to do so as
well as any such reasons for such refusal.
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules For Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States
(effective Oct. 20, 1992), art. 24, 3, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/
2STATENG.pdf. In disputes between states, the consequence of refusal to submit vital evidence
seems to be limited to negative inferences, which is what the Commission did in this case. The
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal had on numerous occasions relied on negative inferences for
the determination of disputed facts. INA Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 8 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 373, 382 (1985), discussed in Aldrich, supra note 1, at 339.
... HANDBOOK OF HUMANrrARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 517.
356 Sanctions could take a number of different forms. For example, during the Yugoslavia conflict,
the UN Security Council prohibited the flight of military aircraft in the Bosnian airspace and
authorized the use of all available means to protect humanitarian convoys. Id.
... E.g., S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992); Interim Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), reprinted in Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, Annex I, U.N.Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993).
358 A prime example is the Security Council's authorization of the U.S.-led coalition to use military
force against Iraq in 1991. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). The
interpretation of this resolution as it relates to the U.S.-led use of force against Iraq in 2003 has
become a subject of immense controversy. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the
Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004) (arguing that the U.S. decision not to adopt a
legal doctrine based on preemptive self-defense was a welcome development for the
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civil liability as a mechanism of enforcement of violations of
international humanitarian law has never received the attention it
deserves. Perhaps the only recent exception in this respect is the UNCC,
which sought to compensate victims of violations within the context of
the United Nations enforcement mechanism.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission shares some common
characteristics with the UNCC. It is, however, a mutually agreed ad hoc
forum established for the purpose of compensating victims of violations
of humanitarian law. It is an unprecedented forum in many respects.
Constituted by a mutual agreement between warring states, it sought to
enforce violations of international humanitarian law through the
determination of civil liability.
By so doing, it has served several important purposes: (1) it has
contributed to the development of norms of international humanitarian
law in the civil compensation context, (2) it has significantly contributed
to the emerging consensus regarding the status of some norms of
international humanitarian law as customary norms, (3) it has identified
gaps in the existing standards of international humanitarian law and
suggested the development of new norms to fill those gaps, (4) it has
refined procedures and evidentiary standards of adjudication for mass
claims processes, (5) it has clearly demonstrated that there is a feasible
way to determine civil liability for violations of international
humanitarian law occurring during and in the aftermath of armed conflict
for the compensation of victims of such violations, and most importantly,
(6) it has shown that determination of civil liability is a realistic
alternative and an important supplement to criminal prosecution as a
mechanism of enforcement of violations of humanitarian law.
Armed conflicts are seriously affecting the lives of societies in
many parts of the world today. The work of this Commission will likely
maintenance of world order but contending that the U.S. legal theory that Resolution 678
authorized the use of force in 2003 is not persuasive).
359 For example, in 1993, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); and in 1994, it
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994). Prosecution of individuals for violations of customs and laws of war is perhaps
the oldest and most frequently used method of enforcement. For example, discussions of
prosecutions for violations of customs of war have been noted to have occurred as early as the
middle ages by the forces that defeated Napoleon. See HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 518 n.9; see generally M.H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN
THE LATE MIDDLE AGES (1965) (discussing early history); Bassiouni, supra note 5 (discussing
the background of international criminal tribunals established since the First World War).
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reinvigorate the debate over the importance of designing different
mechanisms of enforcement of laws governing the conducts of these
conflicts. This Commission has established a unique and workable
model for future post-conflict adjudications of claims for compensation.
It will likely inspire more interest in civil liability as a viable mechanism
of enforcement of international humanitarian law.

